What Iran Is Permitted To Do Under The JCPOA

 IRAN UPDATE RIGHT SIDE NEWS3 600

By: Yigal Carmon* | MEMRI

 

Support or opposition to the nuclear deal should be predicated on the text of the JCPOA.

Here are a few examples of what Iran can do under the JCPOA. These actions – permitted under the JCPOA – clearly contradict statements and arguments raised recently by administration officials.

Iran Can Pursue The Development Of A Nuclear Device And Key Nuclear Technologies

Under the JCPOA, Iran can conduct activities “which could  contribute  to  the  design  and  development of a nuclear explosive device” if these activities are “approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.”[1]  If anything should have been totally and absolutely banned by this agreement it is activity suitable for the development of a nuclear device. President Obama’s declared rationale for the agreement is to distance Iran from a nuclear device. The JCPOA, under certain conditions allows even that.

Also nowhere in the JCPOA does Iran promise to refrain from development of key technologies that would be necessary to develop a nuclear device. To the contrary, Ali Akbar Salehi head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran stated that: “We are building nuclear fusion now, which is the technology for the next 50 years.”[2]

Iran Can Prevent The Inspection Of Military Sites

Under the JCPOA the IAEA cannot go wherever the evidence leads. The JCPOA allows Iran to reject a priori any request to visit a military facility. This exclusion was included in the JCPOA by introducing a limitation under which a request that “aims at interfering with military or other national security activities” is not admissible. [3]

The ban on visits to military sites has been enunciated by all regime figures from Supreme Leader Khamenei downwards. Supreme Leader Khamenei specified: “(The foreigners) shouldn’t be allowed at all to penetrate into the country’s security and defensive boundaries under the pretext of inspection, and the country’s military officials are not permitted at all to allow the foreigners to cross these boundaries or stop the country’s defensive development under the pretext of supervision and inspection.” [4]

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that such visits crossed a red line and were successfully rejected by Iran during the negotiations.[5] Supreme Leader Khamenei’s top adviser for international affairs Ali Akbar Velayati stated: “The access of inspectors from the IAEA or from any other body to Iran’s military centers is forbidden.”[6]

Administration spokespersons persist in claiming that military facilities will also come under inspection in total contradiction to the language of the JCPOA and the Iranian position.

There Will Be No Snap Back Of Sanctions

Under the JCPOA snap back is not automatic but will be dependent on UN Security Council approval.

Additionally, a declaration has been introduced into the JCPOA and thus became an integral part of the agreement, namely that “Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”[7] The inclusion of this clause in the agreement makes the reimposition of sanctions in the optimal case, the subject of litigation, when Iran can contend that the other side is in violation of the agreement.

Sanctions Duration On The Issue Of Missile Development Can Be Shortened To Less Than Eight Years

Under the JCPOA the sanctions on missile development need not remain in place for eight years but can be lifted earlier, namely whenever “the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.”[8]

Arak Will Remain A Heavy Water And Hence A Plutonium Capable Facility; Iran’s Plutonium Pathway Was Not Totally Blocked

Arak houses Iran’s heavy water facility. Despite the vague wording in the JCPOA, (i.e. Iran will “redesign” and “modernize” the reactor),[9] it will also continue to operate partially as a heavy water facility a key element needed in plutonium production.

 

 

[2] Farsnews.com, August 9, 2015.

[3] JCPOA, Annex I, Q.74.

[4]  Ibid.

[5] Latimes.com, July 22, 2015

[6] http://english.farsnews.com/print.aspx?nn=13940510000646

[7] JCPOA, Section I, Article C, Paragraph 26. See footnote 1 for link to text.

[8] JCPOA, Annex V, D.19. See footnote 1 for link to text.

[9] JCPOA, I.B.8. See footnote 1 for link to text.

SOURCE: MEMRI