I won't supply a long list here but instead will talk about the latest one. Let's take it step by step to see what a mess is being created.

Background: Israel announced in 1993, at the time of the Oslo agreement with the PLO, that it did not view construction on existing settlements as a violation. The Palestinians, during the ensuing 16 years, never made this a big issue. The U.S. government, while it can say it technically opposed this, was pretty quiet about it, never did anything.

Then President Barack Obama came to office and made the construction issue the centerpiece of his Middle East policy, sometimes it has appeared to be the keystone of his whole foreign policy. It may seem like an exaggeration but often it seems as if the administration believes that if Israel stopped building 3000 apartments all the region's problems would go away.

So far, the Administration has wasted almost ten months in this pursuit. First, it shouted at Israel as if it were some servant to do it fast or else. Then when Israel didn't, the Administration realized that perhaps Israel should get something in exchange for the concession. So it went to Arab states and asked-presuming, wrongly, that they are desperate for a peace agreement-for some compromise but got nothing.

Now it had destroyed its own policy since the Palestinian Authority (PA) refused to come to negotiations until there was a complete freeze. How could it be less hardline than the president?

But there was a solution, sort of. Israel agreed to stop all construction once the apartments currently being built are finished. And naturally, Israel said, this didn't apply to east Jerusalem.

The United States accepted the deal, with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton exulting about what a huge concession Israel was making. Aside from everything else, the U.S. government knew how big a risk Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was taking with his coalition.

Ok. Sorry to give you all this background but it is necessary to understand how the Administration loves to jump in the quicksand.

So what happened? The PA couldn't stand to see Israel being praised and doesn't want to negotiate peace any way. So it threw a temper tantrum: riots in Jerusalem, threats by PA leader Mahmoud Abbas to resign, refusal to go to negotiations with Israel, and a clamor for a unilateral declaration of independence.

The hubbub about a unilateral declaration of independence was almost universally described in the media as arising from Palestinian frustration. Not at all. It is based on their own position: Why make a compromise peace with Israel when you can just claim everything you want, ensuring the door be kept open for a future struggle to wipe Israel off the map entirely?

What did the Administration do? It backed down on everything except the independence bid! Having made a deal with Israel, having gotten Netanyahu to take an enormous risk, it then pulled the rug out from under him. Now it said: Well, maybe it wasn't such a great deal after all.

Those who always advocate Israeli concessions as the solution should take note. Once again, we've seen that a concession doesn't lead to a concession by the other side or progress. It just produces a demand for more concessions without giving any real credit to the last one.

This kind of thing is expected from the PA but one can only say: Et tu Obama? (William Shakespeare's line for Julius Caesar after his supposed friend, Brutus, stabbed him in the back.) Mind you, the Administration doesn't mean any harm-after all, it may end up the biggest loser-it just has no idea of what it's doing.

The latest act in the drama is that after an announcement that Israel would some day build apartments in the Gilo section of Jerusalem-which is quite within the U.S.-Israel deal and, by the way, is not in east Jerusalem-the Administration complained bitterly, showing not only that it wouldn't respect agreements others made with predecessors but it wouldn't even respect the agreements it made itself.

Obama said that the Gilo construction complicates administration efforts to relaunch peace talks, makes it harder to achieve peace and embitters the Palestinians.

Funny, he never said this about: PA incitement to terrorism; failure to punish terrorists; negotiations with Hamas despite its hardline positions, genocidal goals, antisemitic views, and terrorist acts; refusal to return to talks with Israel despite Obama's express request to do so; breaking its promise on not to be a sponsor of using the Goldstone report to punish Israel; and other such actions. Each of these individually is more dangerous than the Gilo construction.

Now here's another point you probably won't see anywhere except here:

Having sabotaged negotiations by escalating the construction-on-settlements issue, the Administration has now escalated even higher: no construction in Jerusalem is the minimum demand. Of course, Arab states and the PA will echo this, refusing all talks unless that happens. And since Israel won't stop building in Jerusalem and the Arab side won't-unlike the Administration-back down-Obama has just guaranteed a dead peace process for his entire four-year term in office. In fact, he's probably ensured no comprehensive negotiations will take place, much less succeed.

Talk about painting yourself into a corner, and the Administration keeps making that corner smaller!

Here's another problem: By blaming Israel repeatedly for every failure, the Administration is not only signalling the PA and Arab states that they can do anything and pay no cost, it is also unintentionally encouraging them to sabotage any progress. Why? Because the worse and slower things go the more they can blame Israel and expect the United States and Europe to do so also. The Administration is making its own failure far more likely.

One final point: The same loss of U.S. credibility and reliability that affects Israel also hits the relatively moderate Arab states in the Administration's dealings with them. The Obama Administration is doing the same thing to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, and other Arab regimes. See here for details on that factor.

No doubt we will soon be hearing that if Israel stopped building apartments in Gilo there would be Arab-Israeli peace, no terrorism, Iran would give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and Obama would get the Nobel Peace Prize. Oops, that last event has already happened. How about giving him the Nobel Peace-Destroying Prize.

The Daled Amos blog has a terrific evaluation of how much the Obama Administration has accomplished (not) on Arab-Israeli issues. The story begins with a hysterically funny State Department press briefing where a spokesguy claims Obama has done more in nine months than the previous president did in eight years.

Then, the claim quickly--and embarrassingly--collapses when a reporter who knows something on the subject asks a few questions. The spokesman insists that the Obama Administration succeeded in getting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a two-state solution. But, asks the reporter, didn't that happen under the Bush Administration? (Actually, it took place in 1996 under the Clinton Administration).

Within a few minutes, the spokesman backs down entirely. Even he cannot think of a credible achievement for the Obama Administration. It reminds one of the famous essay about the snakes of Ireland whose whole text reads: There aren't any. In this case, the progress--to use the euphemistic language of Washington government--has been all in a backward direction.  The exchange is also a great metaphor for the gap between what the Administration has done and what it gets away with claiming on lots of issues.

[PS: Within minutes of finishing the writing of this piece I started spotting media reactions claiming that Israel is "defying" the United States, that Gilo is a "new settlement" built on "Palestinian land," that it is on the West Bank, etc. I don't recall seeing headlines about the PA defying the United States on any of the points discussed above. As anyone who has been in Gilo knows, it's a neighborhood in Jerusalem with 40,000 people, mostly in pre-1967 Israel, the land beyond that border was purchased by Jews before 1948, and  the idea of building 900 more apartments there is in a years-long approval process and no construction whatsoever is imminent.]

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"Let's be clear when Anwar Al Awlaki was at Dar Al-Hijrah, he was articulating the same message that I articulate today in Dar Al-Hijrah, a very open, a very engaging, a very community wise and contemporary understanding of the faith within the framework of its traditionalism."

But a look at Awlaki's statements and connections during his time at the northern Virginia mosque shows that, at best, Malik's characterization was misinformed as to the facts. While at Dar Al-Hijrah, a mosque with a history of leadership tied to terrorists, Awlaki made statements that endorsed terrorism and defended the 9/11 hijackers.

Awlaki participated as a scholar in a forum of the popular Islamist and Yusuf al-Qaradawi-linked website, Islamonline.net, the week after the 9/11 attacks. In it, he tacitly endorsed terror against Israeli civilians and denied that any Muslim extremists were a threat to Americans:

"There is no Muslim who advocates killing American civilians. We haven't heard that before. If you are talking about Palestinians fighting in Israel, these are freedom fighters fighting an illegal occupation. Muslims have never targeted American civilians."

That's an odd claim, since it had been more than three years since Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa saying that "to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."

In the same Islamonline chat, Awlaki also expressed doubt that Muslims were behind the 9/11 attacks:

"The evidence coming out is perplexing. You have a right to be confused. It appears that these people were victims rather than hijackers. It seems that the FBI went into the roster of the airplanes and whoever has a Muslim or Arab name became the hijacker by default." [Emphasis added]

Furthermore, in a Washington Post forum in November 2001, Awlaki defended the Taliban movement and accused America of rushing into war in Afghanistan. At the time, the Taliban had been openly supporting Al Qaeda. Al-Awlaki argued:

"The Taliban repeatedly said: show us the evidence and we will turn over whoever is guilty with the crime. The US should have given them the benefit of the doubt."

Johari Abdul Malik, who has taken the lead in defending Dar Al-Hijrah and Awlaki, has his own record of radical statements. At a 2001 conference hosted by the Islamic Association of Palestine, a component of a U.S.-based network of Hamas-supporters, Malik called for attacks against Israeli infrastructure to show Muslim displeasure with Israel's treatment of Palestinians:

"I am gonna teach you now. You can blow up bridges, but you cannot kill people who are innocent on their way to work. You can blow up power supplies... the water supply, you can do all forms of sabotage and let the world know that we are doing it like this because they have a respect for the lives of innocent people."

Malik has called for Islamic supremacy in America, as he did in a November 2004 Friday Khutba, or sermon:

"Alhamdullilah [Praise to Allah] and we will live, will see the day when Islam, by the grace of Allah, will become the dominant way of life... I'm telling you don't take it for granted because Allah is increasing this din [religion] in your lifetime. Alhamdullilah [Praise to Allah] that soon, soon... before Allah closes our eyes for the last time, you will see Islam move from being the second largest religion in America - that's where we are now - to being the first religion in America."

Radicalism among Dar Al-Hijrah's leadership is not limited to Malik. At a June 5, 2001 press conference and sit-in at the State Department, Dar Al-Hijrah's current head imam, Shaker Elsayed, was asked, "Do you condemn the terrorist attacks from Hamas and the suicide bombings?" Shaker Elsayed replied in support of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians:

"I made a statement that we do support the Palestinian resistance...The so-called Israeli settlers are not civilian population. They are military reserves, they are armed, trained and dangerous. They invade the Palestinian neighborhoods at night and squander everything. They kill, maim, and destroy homes. If I were there, I would use every power in my hand to defend my family."

And:

"So long as occupation continues, we say to the Palestinian people, go ahead. Continue your fight against occupation no matter what name they give you because we give you the name of courageous people who stand for the rights and we're standing with you."

Yet another example of Elsayed's radicalism can be viewed here.

More than simple pro-terrorist rhetoric, elements of Dar Al-Hijrah's leadership and membership have provided financial and logistical support to terrorist organizations. Records from the successful prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development show that Abdulhaleem Al-Ashqar, a former member of Dar Al-Hijrah's Board of Trustees convicted of contempt and obstruction of justice, organized a 1993 meeting of Hamas members and sympathizers in Philadelphia. He was also the director of the Hamas-linked Al Aqsa Educational Fund. Likewise, Ismail Elbarasse, a founder of Dar Al-Hijrah, worked for Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook and wired $735,000 to Hamas operative Mohammad Salah.

Likewise, additional imams who preceeded and followed Al-Awlaki at Dar Al-Hijrah have been linked to terrorist fundraising groups and extremism.

Mohammed Al-Hanooti, Dar Al-Hijrah's imam from 1995-1999, was the former director of the Islamic Association for Palestine. In 1995, federal prosecutors in New York named Al-Hanooti as a potential unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. While Hanooti had been an imam at the Islamic Center of Jersey City, the FBI considered him to be "a big supporter of Hamas," and the Albany Times Union reported in June 2002 that he regularly hosted events featuring terrorist mastermind Omar Abdel Rahman.

Mohammed Adam El-Sheikh, the imam of Dar Al-Hijrah from August 2003-May 2005, was the former regional director of the Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) in Baltimore. In October 2004, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the worldwide network of IARA, along with five of its senior officials, as Specially Designated Terrorist Groups. The government declared: "Information available to the U.S. indicates that international offices of IARA provided direct financial support for UBL [Osama Bin Laden]." IARA also supported the terrorist groups Hamas and Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI). El-Sheikh was also an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood in his native Sudan from 1973-1977.

All of these facts contradict Malik's assertion that Anwar Al Awlaki was a moderate during his time at Dar Al-Hijrah, or that the mosque is free from violent rhetoric that leads to radicalism. If connections to 9/11 hijackers, praise for Hamas and ties to terrorist support mechanisms are considered moderate, it's fair to ask what Malik considers to be extreme.

Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), one of the lead agencies in the fight against terrorist financing, froze the assets of both al Haramain and Kindhearts in 2004 and 2006 respectively. In both cases, the defendant charities were accused of providing financial support to terrorist groups. Al Haramain allegedly funneled money to Chechen rebels and Kindhearts was accused of funding Hamas.

Neither of the asset seizures was conducted with prior judicial warrants, and consequently, defendants challenged the Treasury actions as a violation of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against warrantless seizures. Although both federal courts agreed with the defendants that the freezing of assets was a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes, they diverged when determining whether an exception to the warrant requirement may apply to seizures of terrorist finances.

The government argued that asset seizures in counter-terrorist financing investigations are exempted from the warrant requirement. Relying upon the "special needs exception," the government explained that no warrant is needed where: (i) the primary purpose of the seizure is beyond criminal law enforcement; and (ii) a warrant and probable cause are impracticable. Applying these factors, the al Haramain court upheld the search on the grounds that a warrant was unnecessary, whereas the Kindhearts court found the exception inapplicable, and invalidated the seizure.

Considering the first factor, the judge in al Haramain explained that the primary purpose of asset seizure is not criminal prosecution, but rather:

"to deprive the designated person of the benefit of the property...that might otherwise be used to further ends that conflict with U.S. interests. Blocking assets of designated terrorists and their supporters prevents their possible use in the orchestration, assistance, or support of unlawful and dangerous global plots."

In contrast, the Kindhearts court found that simply based on the potential for criminal prosecutions, there must be a warrant. While it is true that a criminal prosecution may be the end result in a terrorist financing investigation, it is not the primary purpose of the forfeiture proceedings. Rather, Treasury acts to freeze the assets in order to preempt their use in financing acts of terrorism.

As to the second factor, regarding the warrant and probably cause, the court in Kindhearts ruled that the government had not provided an explanation as to why the warrant requirements were impracticable. In al Haramain, the court came to the opposite conclusion, explaining the impracticability of warrants in asset seizures of terrorist financiers. As the court explained, not only must the government act fast to prevent asset flight, but it would be nearly impossible "to meet the specificity requirements in an application for a warrant, and...to track down assets belonging to the designated individual and apply for a warrant in each jurisdiction in which the asset is located."

As the al Haramain court explained, the Supreme Court has never decided whether an asset seizure in a terrorist financing investigation is subject to Fourth Amendment protections. Recognizing that this question has never been resolved, these two cases present a unique opportunity for the Court to address this unsettled question of law. Moreover, such resolution is absolutely necessary. As it now stands, Treasury officials must seek warrants prior to instituting asset seizures in Ohio, but not in Oregon. In the event that the respective federal Courts of Appeal affirm the district court opinions, the divergent decisions could force the Supreme Court to take up the question. If, and when that happens, hopefully the Justices will agree with the Oregon court that not only is the primary purpose of asset seizures the prevention of future acts of terrorism, but that requiring a warrant prior to such action is not a viable option.

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To view this clip on MEMRI TV, visit http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/2271.htm.

Interviewer: "Let us begin with the most recent development on the American front, and the racial discrimination against Muslims and their persecution - the incident associated with Mr. Nidal Hasan, a Muslim psychiatrist of Arab origin, who killed 13 soldiers at the U.S. Fort Hood base. To what extent might this incident affect the Muslims in the U.S. and make them targets of persecution?" 

[...] 

Louis Farrakhan: "As you know, since 9/11, in America and in other parts of the world, those anti-Islamic forces have stepped up their efforts to make Muslims... to cause the Muslims to be looked at as uncivilized, savage, or wicked people. This is an attempt by anti-Islamic forces, and some members of the Jewish community, and some members of the Christian community, who have united to condemn Islam and to speak ill of our Prophet Muhammad, and to even go so far as to say that the Muslims worship the devil. 

[...] 

"It is because, my dear brothers and sisters, Islam was making so much progress in the United States that those anti-Islamic forces are trying to stem the tide of the progress of Islam. 

[...] 

"This recent unfortunate event, which took place at the Fort Hood base in Texas, has only added fuel to the fire. On behalf of all the Muslims in the Muslim world, we are saddened by the loss of these 13 American soldiers and the 30 others who were wounded in the incident. No human being would be pleased to see that kind of slaughter, coming from a fellow officer in the U.S. Army. 

"However, we have to look at Major Nidal Hasan. What happened to him? What kind of stress was he under? What kind of insults had he borne? 

[...] 

"When there are Muslims who love America, and who join the armed forces to protect America, and to serve the interests of America, and then America, unfortunately, under the falsehoods of the George W. Bush administration, launches attacks against Iraq and against Afghanistan, and now, those soldiers are killing Muslims... So when they go to war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the kind of hatred that is built up in the American forces, when they call the Muslims 'ragheads' and 'desert niggers,' and then, in the Abu Ghreib prison, Muslim women were raped, and Muslim men were sodomized... All this affects Muslims serving in the army. So when you are being insulted by your superior officers or by your fellow soldiers, at some point, a person might break. Unfortunately, I believe this is what happened to Captain [sic] Nidal Hasan."

[...] 

Interviewer: "Let me take this phone call from Germany. Mr. Jibril." 

Mr. Jibril (by phone): "Hello. I have a complex question, which I'd like you to let me finish. It is directed to Mr. Farrakhan."  

Interviewer: "Go ahead."  

Mr. Jibril: "The Africans in America - or rather, the Afro-Americans - were subjugated for many years, and conducted a very long struggle for justice and equality, so they, of all people, best understand the issue of justice and equality. You are visiting Tripoli. You are, as a matter of fact, visiting a tyrannical regime, which is subjugating the Libyans and plundering their money. You are receiving impure money, plundered from the Libyan people. You are receiving it from Al-Qadhafi. Years ago, Al-Qadhafi killed 1,200 Libyan political prisoners within a matter of hours. He annihilated them. So how can you accept this, in the name of Islam, and in the name of our Afro-American brothers, who have tasted such suffering? How can you accept impure money from a tyrant?"  

Interviewer: "We got the idea. Do you have any other question? Go ahead, Mr. Louis Farrakhan."  

Louis Farrakhan: "I'm saying to you, sir, that we are not pillaging the wealth of Tripoli or Libya. Libya is not offering us money. The progress we have made in America is by the pooling of the nickels, and the dimes, and the dollars of the poor people who backed Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam. Let me ask you this, my dear brother. Is there one leader, one king, one ruler in the whole world who is not guilty of some sin?"

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent, non-profit organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle East. Copies of articles and documents cited, as well as background information, are available on request.

 -----------------------

MEMRI holds copyrights on all translations. Materials may only be used with proper attribution.

MEMRI
P.O. Box 27837, Washington, DC 20038-7837
Phone: (202) 955-9070
Fax: (202) 955-9077
www.memri.org

"Islamists 'promote jihad in jail'," from BBC News, November 15 (thanks to all who sent this in):

Radical Muslims are spreading extremist propaganda and promoting jihad from inside UK jails, a report has claimed.

Counter-extremism think tank the Quilliam Foundation said radicals were also being allowed to lead prayers.

And its report said extremist cleric Abu Qatada had issued fatwas from Long Lartin prison in Worcestershire where he is awaiting deportation.

The Ministry of Justice said it had a dedicated unit to tackle the risk of extremism and radicalisation in prison.

But are they tackling it? And how does tackling "the risk" differ from tackling the actual, ongoing situation of "radicalization" in prisons? Seems like it's a bit late for the former. It's striking to note how often such statements are weaselly worded to blur the distinction between potential and genuine action, with phrases like "taking steps to ensure," or "working closely with our partners," or perhaps "actively partnering with..."

Messages released

The Quilliam Foundation said the study, to be published on Monday, was based largely on accounts sneaked out of prisons by high-profile extremists.

The report said: "Prominent pro al-Qaeda ideologues such as Abu Qatada have been able to smuggle messages out of prison to their supporters.

"Other convicted extremists have issued pro-jihadist statements from prison while others have appeared on Islamic TV stations from within prison.

"In 2008 and 2009, two of the most prominent Arab jihadists imprisoned in the UK released pro-jihadist propaganda and fatwas from within Long Lartin prison.

"Adel Abdel Bary, a leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, produced written pro-jihadist tracts from within prison aiming to refute criticism of al-Qaeda, while Abu Qatada issued fatwas from within prison which legitimised jihadist attacks worldwide."

Mid-Worcestershire MP Peter Luff, whose constituency includes Long Lartin, plans to raise the report's findings with Home Secretary Alan Johnson and Justice Secretary Jack Straw.

'Deeply dangerous'

Mr Luff said: "In my view the courts have, in the past, failed to protect us by allowing the release of dangerous individuals from Long Lartin and other prisons, and by delaying the deportation of many others.

"While these deeply dangerous men remain in British custody, we must be absolutely confident that they can do no harm - and these revelations suggest we cannot be confident of that.

"The government must move quickly to address the exceptionally serious issues this report raises."

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In an act that further makes a mockery of the Islamist threat that faces us, the administration has decided that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Gitmo detainees will be sent to New York City to stand trial in a civilian federal court for their role in the 9/11 atrocity. According to Attorney General Eric Holder, prosecutors will seek the death penalty.

No word yet if Lynne Stewart has offered to be on the defense team.

"For over 200 years our nation has relied upon a faithful adherence to the rule of law," Holder told a news conference at the Justice Department. "Once again, we will ask our legal system in two venues to answer that call." Yes, but "rule of law" usually applies only to citizens and others who are here legally - not terrorists and other enemy combatants. These men did not break into someone's house and burgle it. They were part of a plot that killed thousands of Americans in what was an overt act of war against our people and our nation.

Yet we treat them like common criminals who deserve due process. Not even Hollywood could come up with a plot this ridiculous.

Is there a hidden agenda here? According to Andrew McCarthy, there is:

This summer, I theorized that Attorney General Eric Holder - and his boss - had a hidden agenda in ordering a re-investigation of the CIA for six-year-old alleged interrogation excesses that had already been scrutinized by non-partisan DOJ prosecutors who had found no basis for prosecution. The continuing investigations of Bush-era counterterrorism policies (i.e., the policies that kept us safe from more domestic terror attacks), coupled with the Holder Justice Department's obsession to disclose classified national-defense information from that period, enable Holder to give the hard Left the "reckoning" that he and Obama promised during the 2008 campaign. It would be too politically explosive for Obama/Holder to do the dirty work of charging Bush administration officials; but as new revelations from investigations and declassifications are churned out, Leftist lawyers use them to urge European and international tribunals to bring "torture" and "war crimes" indictments. Thus, administration cooperation gives Obama's base the reckoning it demands but Obama gets to deny responsibility for any actual prosecutions.

Today's announcement that KSM and other top al-Qaeda terrorists will be transferred to Manhattan federal court for civilian trials neatly fits this hidden agenda. Nothing results in more disclosures of government intelligence than civilian trials. They are a banquet of information, not just at the discovery stage but in the trial process itself, where witnesses - intelligence sources - must expose themselves and their secrets. (emphasis added)

Last December, these men wanted to plead guilty to further their role as martyrs - and today they're being put on trial with all the bells and whistles usually reserved for American citizens, along with cameras in the courtroom so that the entire world can see and hear everything. They confessed - and now they are referred to as "alleged masterminds," "accused," and "suspects." That's quite a reversal.

And, as Rush Limbaugh points out, the ones on trial here are not Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his merry band of jihadists, but the CIA, FBI, the former Bush administration and anyone else connected to keeping our nation safe. In other words, the United States itself will be on trial.

Let's put aside the fact that, as Andrew McCarthy notes, intelligence sources must expose themselves and their secrets, putting themselves and their intel networks at risk. That in and of itself is bad enough. But what if the prosecution bungles the case? What if these guys get off on a technicality or, heaven forbid, they are found innocent by a jury of their, er, peers because there is enough "reasonable doubt"? These things are possible in a trial in a civilian courtroom. Where will they be released? Here in the United States? Or deported back to their home countries, where they will probably get the same hero's welcome as Libya's Lockerbie bomber? Either way, we lose.

If they're released, look for a tell-all book that will be hyped on the television talk show circuit. I can see the title now: Growing Up Jihadist: How We Snuffed Out the Lives of Millions of Americans and Lived to Tell the Tale. If we're going to give them the "American way" treatment, we might as well go whole hog in our efforts.

And if they are found guilty, where will they be sent to prison? Certainly not back to Guantanamo Bay, which the Obama administration has been promising to close. That leaves federal prison, where the chance that they'll radicalize other American prisoners is a very real threat.

Debra Burlingame told Fox News that this decision "is a travesty...and a dark day for all who died on 9/11. These men...are getting the full force protection of the United States Constitution. ... They are getting the same rights of United States citizens. ... [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] will rally his jihadi brothers to kill more Americans."

Perhaps those who support this decision believe that the system will "work" and these men will be thrown in prison for the rest of their days. Even if that happens, the jihadists will still have won because they will have used our own system against us - part of their stealth jihad - and the American taxpayer will fund the effort that ultimately is against their own interests.

It certainly says something when the decision to try terrorist enemy combatants in a civilian courtroom took less time than it took to decide on how to memorialize those who perished in the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 - a decision, by the way, that has yet to be made.

That stinging sensation you feel? It's a slap in the face to all Americans from the government officials who swore to protect us. Thanks for nothing.

-------------------------------------------------

Pam Meister is the editor of FamilySecurityMatters.org.

• A Hollywood production designed to divert attention from the Goldstone Report: Iranian reactions to the interception of the "Francop" cargo ship
• Different voices in Tehran over the rapprochement with Turkey
• Yet another example of the Revolutionary Guards' increasing involvement in the economy: Khatam-ol Anbiya Corporation won a railway network construction tender
• The internal security forces chief calls for stricter monitoring of web surfers 
• Picture of the week: the biggest check in the history of the Iranian economy

A Hollywood production designed to deflect criticism from the Goldstone Report:

Iranian reactions to the interception of the "Francop" cargo ship

Last week, Iran rejected Israel's claims that the "Francop" cargo ship, seized by Israel one week earlier, carried weapons from Iran to Hezbollah, accusing Israel of an attempt to take advantage of the arms ship affair to avoid the repercussions of the Goldstone Report. An announcement issued by the Iranian mission to the UN stated that Israel's allegations were meant to deflect public opinion from the Goldstone Report, and that Iran strongly rejected the allegations brought up by Israel against it (ISNA, November 7).

Last weekend, IRNA, Iran's official news agency, referred to Israel's allegations as a "public relations trick" to divert attention from the Goldstone Report and to prevent it from influencing public opinion on the issue of Israel (IRNA, November 9).

Asr-e Iran, a website associated with the pragmatic conservative bloc, rejected Israel's claims as well, saying that the affair was a "Hollywood production" designed to let Israel avoid the dangerous repercussions of the Goldstone Report. The report could jeopardize Israel's international status after years of influencing Western media; therefore, Israel had to produce alternative news stories to push aside media reports on the Goldstone Report. The website also rejected the claims that the documents seized on board the vessel indicated that the weapons had originated in Iran. There had never been an incident, according to the website, in which a weapons-smuggling country left behind incriminating documents that could attest to its involvement in the smuggling operation.

Furthermore, even if the ship did carry Iranian weapons to Syria, that is not an argument in favor of Israel's position, since Israel, which was accused of perpetrating war crimes by the UN, holds advanced, modern weaponry, including nuclear arms, without anyone objecting. What is a few missiles and grenades compared to the nuclear arms in the possession of a country that has not signed the NPT, Asr-e Iran says. Just as the US sells weapons to Israel, Iran has the right to maintain the regional balance of power and its status, engaging in a defensive cooperation with its allies. Israel had better give up its claims, which do nothing but hinder it, and contact international lawyers to defend it from being put to trial for the war crimes it had committed (Asr-e Iran, November 7).

The Tabnak website came up with another possible explanation for Israel's claims, saying that the interception of the ship by Israel and its allegations against Iran were meant to allow Israel to enlist the support of the American administration against Iran, just as it had done in the Karine-A affair in early 2002. In January 2002, Israel took advantage of the Karine-A affair to have Iran included in the "Axis of Evil" by former President George W. Bush. Now, Israel is trying to make use of a similar affair to exert pressure on President Obama following his political initiatives towards Iran. Similarly to what is happening now, the website says, it soon became apparent that Iran was in no way involved in the Karine-A affair, but it was blamed anyway. Therefore, Israel is once again attempting to derail the American initiatives towards Iran, and to persuade the administration to take a hostile stance vis-à-vis Iran (Tabnak, November 6).

Different voices in Tehran over the rapprochement with Turkey

During his visit to Turkey last week as part of an international Islamic economic convention, Iran's president said during a meeting with Turkey's President Tayyip Erdoğan that a further increase could be expected in the cooperation between Iran and Turkey (IRNA, November 9).

However, different voices were heard last week in Iran over the rapprochement between the two countries, particularly from members of the reformist bloc. In an interview granted by Dr. Bahram Amir Ahmadian to the "Iranian Diplomacy" website, the expert on Turkish affairs warned against a possible Turkish attempt to improve its regional status at Iran's expense. Ahmadian did note that the relations between Iran and Turkey were beneficial; he added, however, that they mostly served Turkish economic and political interests. He said that Turkey was interested in becoming a center for transferring energy from Iran to Europe, strengthening its regional status in order to convince the European Union to admit Turkey as a member and a bridge between Europe on one hand and Asia and the Middle East on the other.

That Turkish policy, Ahmadian said, did not serve Iranian interests, since it could come at the expense of Iran's position in the regional balance of power. With a population not larger than Iran's and without energy sources of its own, Turkey's GDP is now three times that of Iran. Ahmadian noted that the recent suggestion to transfer enriched uranium from Iran to Turkey could be a Turkish attempt to boost its position as a mediator between Iran and the West. Iran may benefit from its relations with Turkey, Ahmadian concluded, but in order to do that it must formulate an internal policy based on the cooperation between all of Iran's national forces to better position itself on the international scene (Diplomasi-ye Irani, November 9).

In an editorial published on November 3, the conservative daily Keyhan also addressed the changes in Turkey's policy and its deteriorating relationship with Israel. The daily noted that the change in the Turkish attitude towards Israel could not be brushed off as a short-term tactical adaptation in order to meet temporary objectives. According to the article, the change in Turkey's policy is rooted in its internal politics and the strengthening Islamic faction.

The daily noted, however, that Turkey was still governed by a secular constitution, that it was a member of NATO, and its army was under the control of a group which saw itself as the "defender of secularism"; therefore, an all-encompassing change in its policy towards the West should not be expected.

In the near future, Turkey is likely to maintain its relations with the Western bloc and even with Israel. Nevertheless, the daily's assessment is that the strategic change led by the Islamists will likely put an end to Turkey's absolute affiliation with the West, leading to the adoption of a new attitude towards the regional resistance bloc. The strengthening of Turkey's commercial ties with Islamic countries, mainly Iran, may empower the Turkish Islamic movement and lay the groundwork for more significant changes in Turkey in the future.

Meanwhile, in recent days Iranian officials have stepped up their criticism of the energy agreement signed during the Turkish prime minister's visit to Iran approximately two weeks ago. Last week, several Iranian Majles members complained that the Petroleum Ministry had not yet briefed the Majles about the details of the agreement, expressing their concern that the agreement could jeopardize Iranian economic interests.

One of the arguments was that Iran's agreement to transport significant quantities of gas to Turkey in exchange for Turkish investments in the development of the South Pars gas field contradicted the recommendations made by Iranian experts in recent years that Iran must avoid exporting gas to other countries in the near future due to the shortage of gas for internal consumption.

Moayed Hosseini-Sadr, a member of the Majles Energy Committee, said last week that the committee intended to summon the Petroleum Minister and have him brief the committee on the details of the energy agreement between Iran and Turkey (Khabar Online, November 8).

Last week, the reformist daily Aftab-e Yazd addressed the Turkish PM's announcement according to which Iran had given Turkey the right to export more than 50 percent of its gas production. An editorial published by the daily strongly criticized the fact that no official Iranian source had commented on or denied that announcement.

If Iran did give Turkey such a right, the article said, then it was an unprecedented, troubling development. The daily mentioned that only five years ago, Iran's conservatives had fiercely contested agreements signed by Khatami's government with Turkey in the spheres of telecommunications and development of the new international airport in Tehran, claiming that Turkish companies were under Zionist influence (Aftab-e Yazd, November 5).

Yet another example of the Revolutionary Guards' increasing involvement in the economy:

Khatam-ol Anbiya Corporation won a railway network construction tender

Last week, Khatam-ol Anbiya, the Revolutionary Guards' construction corporation, won a 2.5-billion dollar tender for the construction of a railway network in the free trade zone in Chabahar, south-eastern Iran. Transportation Minister Hamid Behbahani, who gave the announcement on the corporation's victory in the tender, said that the project would be carried out in three stages. Other participants in the railway network construction tender included Iran's Port and Shipping Organization, an Iranian-Japanese consortium, an Iranian-Chinese consortium, and three other foreign companies (various news agencies, November 10).

Owned by the Revolutionary Guards, Khatam-ol Anbiya is a corporation which employs about 40 thousand workers. It underwent tremendous growth following the Iran-Iraq War, expanding into construction, transportation, industry, agriculture, oil, and gas. In recent years it won billions of dollars' worth of tenders in such areas as dam construction, water supply systems, highways, tunnels, gas lines, and oil and gas field development.

It should be noted that Tose'e-ye E'temad-e Mobin, a corporation some of whose companies are affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards' Cooperation Fund, has recently won the largest transaction ever to take place on the Iranian stock exchange-a public offering of 50 percent plus one share of the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI).

The internal security forces chief calls for stricter monitoring of web surfers

Internal security forces chief Esma'il Ahmadi-Moqaddam announced last week that the internal security forces intended to increase the monitoring of web surfers in Iran. Ahmadi-Moqaddam noted that stricter control of Iran's cyberspace and Internet was one of the security forces' jobs. He complained that the efforts to step up monitoring had so far been unsuccessful due to the opposition of some self-styled intellectual media and civilians, who forced the security forces to back down from their intention to take steps on that issue. During a convention about the war on drugs, Ahmadi-Moqaddam said that the Internet was a fertile ground for many kinds of crime, including smuggling drugs into Iran, and that the internal security forces therefore intended to step up the enforcement of web surfing in the coming years (ISNA, November 9).

Meanwhile, the reformist website Rooz Online reported that in recent days, Iranian website operators had received e-mails and text messages from the authorities, threatening them to cease using the Internet for transferring information that is illegal or information that compromises state security. The operators were warned that unless they cease and desist, legal action would be taken against them (Rooz Online, November 10).

Over the course of the past year, the internal security forces have stepped up the monitoring of Iranian websites and blogs after the Majles passed a computer crime bill and the judiciary announced the establishment of a special court for computer and Internet offenses. Within that context, more effort is put into filtering websites and blogs, while arrests of citizens involved in operating illegal websites have become more commonplace.

According to the computer crime bill recently passed by the Majles, a special committee has been established whose role is to determine the criteria for website filtering. Its members include the morality police chief in the internal security forces, the ministers of education, telecommunications, justice, science, culture, Islamic guidance or their representatives, chairman of the Islamic Information Organization, chairman of the Iranian Broadcasting Authority, an expert on computers and communications technology, and a Majles representative.

Picture of the week: the biggest check in the history of the Iranian economy

The sale of 50 percent plus one share of the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) to the Tose'e-ye E'temad-e Mobin corporation was completed last week.

The corporation transferred 15,638,329,212,448 rials (over 1.5 billion dollars) in cash to the Tehran stock exchange for 20 percent of the company's shares. Fars News Agency, which published a photograph of the historic check, noted that it was the biggest check ever written in the history of the Iranian economy. The total sum of the TCI share offering was about 7.8 billion dollars.

Events this week focused on the seizure of the MV Franco, carrying a large quantity of arms (photo left--thousands of rockets, mortar shells and ammunition), apparently for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Their Iranian origin was clearly shown by the ship's manifest and the labels on the containers and sacks of polyethylene pellets found on board.

Hezbollah has denied any connection to the weapons, while the Lebanese and Syrian media claim that Israel committed an act of "piracy" whose objective was to draw attention away from the Goldstone Report.

Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority, held a press conference to announce that he would not seek reelection in January 2010. His motives were apparently his mounting frustration with the stalled peace process and his deep disappointment with the American administration.

Gaza Strip

Rocket and mortar shell fire

On November 9 one rocket hit was identified. The rocket landed in an open area near a city in the western Negev. There were no casualties and no damage was done. No organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

Rocket and mortar shell fired into Israeli territory ¹

Judea and Samaria
Counterterrorism Activities

The Israeli security forces continued their counterterrorism activities this past week, detaining Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities. There were daily incidents, chiefly the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles. At least five Israeli civilians were wounded.

Among the incidents were the following:

• November 9: Stones were thrown at an Israeli vehicle southwest of Nablus. An Israeli civilian sustained minor injuries (IDF Spokesman, November 9).

• November 9: Stones were thrown at an Israeli vehicle east of Qalqiliya. There were no casualties but the vehicle was damaged (IDF Spokesman, November 9).

• November 8: Stones were thrown at an Israeli vehicle in the Jewish settlement in Hebron. There were no casualties but the vehicle was damaged (IDF Spokesman, November 8).

• November 6: A Molotov cocktail was thrown at an Israeli vehicle south of Nablus. There were no casualties and no damage was done (IDF Spokesman, November 6).

• November 5: Stones were thrown at an Israeli vehicle northeast of Ramallah. An Israeli woman sustained minor injuries (IDF Spokesman, November 5).

• November 5: Stones were thrown at a large number of Israeli vehicles west of Bethlehem. Three Israeli civilians were wounded (IDF Spokesman, November 5).

• November 5: A Molotov cocktail was thrown at an Israeli vehicle east of Qalqiliya. There were no casualties but the vehicle was damaged (IDF Spokesman, November 5).

• November 4: Stones were thrown at an Israeli vehicle southeast of Qalqiliya. There were no casualties but the vehicle was damaged (IDF Spokesman, November 4).

The Israeli Navy seized a boat carrying a shipment of weapons from Iran for Hezbollah in Lebanon

On the night of November 3, 2009, the Israeli Navy stopped an arms shipment on its way from Iran to Syria, apparently destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon. The weapons were being transported by the cargo ship MV Francop, which was flying the Antigua and Barbuda flag, and was rented by UFS (United Feeding Services), a Cypriot freight delivery company. The weapons were delivered from Iran and unloaded at the Egyptian port of Damiat, where they were transferred to the MV Francop on November 2-3 and dispatched to the Syrian port of Latakia, with scheduled stops at Limassol, Cyprus, and Beirut, Lebanon. About 500 tons of weapons were seized, hidden in 36 containers. The arms included thousands of 107mm and 122mm rockets, 106mm recoilless artillery shells, hand grenades and various types of light weapon ammunition.

The ship's manifest falsely described the containers as holding 24,224 sacks of polyethylene. In reality, the many labels on the containers, the ship's manifest and the polyethylene sacks in the containers used to camouflage the weapons clearly show that the weapons came from Iran. They indicate that the Iranians, possibly overconfident, did not bother to conceal the weapons' point of origin. The weapons themselves, however, did not bear any signs of having been manufactured in Iran.²

Cases of weapons camouflaged with sacks of polyethylene pellets.		One of the cases labeled SEPAH (Iranian Revolutionary Guards).

After its release the ship sailed to the port of Beirut, where it was examined by the Lebanese Navy and UNIFIL. Lebanese military intelligence agents interrogated the crew, who stated that the ship was the victim of "Israeli piracy," and had been forced to change course for the port of Ashdod. They said the cargo was supposed to be unloaded at the Syrian port of Latakia (Lebanese News Agency, November 8, 2009).

In Lebanon and Syria reactions to the seizure of the ship continue, more from the media than from official sources. Most of them call it "an act of piracy," claiming that its objective was to draw attention away from the Goldstone Report. The main reactions were the following:

Lebanon

Sources within Hezbollah denied any connection with the weapons, denouncing Israel's "act of piracy" (Radio Nur, November 5, 2009). Mohammad Yaghi, the Hezbollah official in charge of the Bekaa region, said that the organization had weapons which were far in advance of those on board the ship (Al-Manar TV, November 9, 2009).

"A Lebanese security source" was quoted as saying that seizing the ship was Israel's excuse to attack Hezbollah and that the organization was being careful (Al-Madina, November 7, 2009). Muhammad Qamati, senior Hezbollah activist, said that he did not think Israel would attack Hezbollah in the near future (Al-Manar TV, November 8, 2009).

• On November 7 the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar claimed that the ship's cargo contained only foodstuffs sent from Iran to Syria and that according to the crew, Israel did not confiscate any arms. The paper claimed that if Israel had found weapons it would not have released the crew immediately. It also asked why the weapons had not been confiscated when the ship anchored in the Egyptian port of Damiat.

• The Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese paper Al-Akhbar claimed that it was hard not to make the connection between the seizure of the ship and the Goldstone Report when it came to timing and Israel's line of defense against the Report (Al-Akhbar, November 5, 2009).

• On November 6, the Lebanese paper Al-Safir criticized Syria and Iran, which dismissed the arms ship and did not bother to deny the Israeli claim and lodge a complaint with the UN and the Security Council, and instead placed all the responsibility on Hezbollah.

Syria

The editor of the Syrian daily Tishrin claimed that the objective in seizing the ship was to draw the world's attention away from the Goldstone Report, but that Israel had failed to do so (Tishrin, November 7, 2009). Columnists for Al-Thawra claimed that the objective of Israel's so-called "act of piracy" was to draw the attention of the West to the danger presented by Iran and change the UN's agenda from deliberating the Goldstone Report to dealing with the weapons ship (Al-Thawra, November 6, 2009). 

The crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip

During the past week the crossings were open and 599 trucks entered to deliver merchandise .

The Hamas security forces continue preventing rocket fire

The Internet forum of the global jihad posted a video entitled "The Border Police." According to the video, the Hamas security forces prevented a squad of operatives from one of the global jihad organizations from firing four rockets into Israel territory from the northern Gaza Strip (Global jihad forum, November 5, 2009).

Hamas reportedly held a series of meetings with senior operatives of the various terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip to examine the possibility of integrating them into its own security forces, subordinate to its interior ministry. It was even suggested that the military-terrorist wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad be integrated into Hamas' security forces. So far the heads of the PIJ have rejected the proposal. Army of Islam operatives, on the other hand, have agreed, since the offer included appointing Mumtaz Dughmush to a senior position in the security forces (Qudsnet, November 8, 2009).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad military training course

On November 9 the military-terrorist wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad held graduation exercises for a group of its operatives. The theme of the ceremony was "I am at your service, Al-Aqsa mosque." The two-month course was held in the Al-Zeitun neighborhood of Gaza City, and covered various types of training, including the use of live ammunition. The graduation was attended by senior PIJ members, one of whom, Khaled al-Batash, said that the courses and training would continue until "the flags of Islam and jihad are flown over the walls and minarets of Al-Aqsa mosque (Palestinian Islamic Jihad website, November 9, 2009).

Palestinian Islamic Jihad graduation exercises
(Palestinian Islamic Jihad forum, November 9, 2009).

Hamas test fires a rocket with a range of 60 kilometers

On November 3, General Amos Yadlin, head of Israeli military intelligence, told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee that the previous week Hamas had test fired a rocket with a range of almost 60 kilometers, or 37.28 miles. Such a rocket could reach cities south of Tel Aviv such as Rishon Lezion, Holon and Bat Yam (Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff for Haaretz, November 4, 2009). Apparently Hamas fired a standard rocket manufactured abroad, in our assessment in Iran, which supports Hamas' efforts to rebuild and upgrade its military infrastructure.

Hamas responses :

• Abu Obeida, spokesmen for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, denied the report, calling it incitement against the Palestinian "resistance" [i.e., Hamas and the other terrorist organizations] and against the Gaza Strip (Filisteen al-'An, November 3, 2009).

• Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas spokesman, also denied the report, stating that Israel was trying to influence world public opinion with an eye to the discussion of the Goldstone Report in the UN General Assembly. He said that Israel was using "media distortions" to avoid being punished by the international community (Hamas' Palestine-Info website, November 3, 2009).

The continuing Islamization of the Gaza Strip

The interior ministry of the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip issued an official announcement on its website banning women from riding with men on motorcycles. The police, according to the announcement, would be on the lookout for offenders (Website of Hamas' interior ministry, November 6, 2009).

Hamas spokesmen would not admit that the new regulation was part of its enforced Islamization of the Gazans. Ihab al-Ghussein, interior ministry spokesman, claimed that the decision was made after it had been discovered that the main cause of accidents was women riding behind their husbands or other family members (Reuters, November 8, 2009). Rafiq Abu Hani, spokesman for the Hamas police, told Al-Aqsa TV that the reason for the decision was "to protect public safety," and that the fact that "giving women rides on motorcycles contradicts the nature of Palestinian society" (Al-Aqsa TV, November 10, 2009).

The announcement of the interior ministry of the de facto Hamas administration forbidding women to be given rides on motorcycles.

Mahmoud Abbas announces he will not seek reelection

Mahmoud Abbas, chairman of the Palestinian Authority, held a press conference at which he officially announced he would not seek reelection to the post of president of the Palestinian Authority in the elections which are supposed to be held in January 2010 (Palestinian TV, Wafa News Agency, November 5, 2009). The reasons for his decision were apparently his mounting frustration with the stalled peace process and the position of the United States. It is also possible that he is trying to use his refusal to exert political pressure on Israel and the United States.

The Fatah and PLO leaderships announced that they did not accept his refusal and that as far as they were concerned, he was their candidate for the upcoming elections. Some of their reactions were the following:

• Salam Fayyad, Palestinian prime minister, said he hoped for a change in the external and internal circumstances which had motivated Mahmoud Abbas to make his announcement. He said that the international community should learn from the failure of the peace process and "return [the Palestinians'] faith" in it by forcing Israel to freeze building in the settlements (Wafa News Agency, November 6, 2009).

• Nabil Abu Rudeina, presidential spokesman, told Sawt al-Arab Radio that behind Mahmoud Abbas' statement were the Israeli government's refusal to relaunch serious negotiations and the refusal of the United States to force Israel to do so (Sawt al-Arab Radio, November 6, 2009).

• Nabil Sha'ath, a member of Fatah's Central Committee, repeatedly stressed the fact that Mahmoud Abbas was Fatah's only candidate. He added that Mahmoud Abbas was very disappointed by international positions toward Israel, especially that of the United States, and by the fact that the activities of last five years and the negotiations with the previous Israeli government had not brought results (Palestinian TV, November 5, 2009).

Hamas spokesmen had the following to say:

• Sami Abu Zuhri, Hamas spokesman, said that Hamas viewed Mahmoud Abbas' announcement as aimed at the United States and Israel, and that it would be better if he appealed to the Palestinians and admitted the failure of the peace process (Official announcement to the press, Hamas' Palestine-Info website, November 5, 2009).

• Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas spokesman, said that Mahmoud Abbas' decision not to run for reelection did not change Hamas' position regarding the elections [i.e., refusal to allow them to be held] (Hamas' Palestine-Info website, November 5, 2009).

The Palestinian public reacted in various ways to the announcement. In general, few people seemed surprised and most saw it as a political maneuver intended to exert pressure on Israel and the United States. There were also a few appeals to Mahmoud Abbas to recant, and his opponents gloated. After the announcement, marches were held in his support throughout Judea and Samaria, and according to reports in the Palestinian media, they were attended by several thousand people.

Frisch, a senior research fellow at Israel's BESA Center for Strategic Studies and senior lecturer at the department of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, argues that it is easier to develop a terrorist infrastructure than to unite one's forces under an organized military.

In the heyday of the Oslo peace process, Yasser Arafat created approximately seventeen different security forces, all of which were doing much the same thing. The Palestinians also established the General Security Services, an umbrella organization set up to coordinate the work of several disparate units. Today, the Palestinian security establishment consists of border police, military intelligence, military police, and a presidential security unit.

These forces, including intelligence units, grew out of the military wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the militias that had served as Arafat's bodyguards during his Jordanian, Lebanese, and Tunisian years. The Palestine Liberation Army was founded in 1965, and its forces, including a small air force and navy, trained with sympathetic Arab militaries.

Frisch shows that having so many security apparatuses was Arafat's way of ensuring he remained in power. The security forces protected his regime from possible coups and reduced the threat of mutiny and insubordination. This labyrinthine system pitted security units against each other and ensured that the military would never grow strong enough to depose him.

The system worked only as long as Arafat himself was on the scene. Since his death, cracks have emerged. Today, the Palestinian security forces continue to be a haphazard collection of units with varying levels of armament. Moreover, as internal fragmentation within Palestinian society has continued to grow since Arafat's death and as clashes between Fatah and Hamas have escalated, the likelihood of a unified military front is becoming more and more a pipe dream. Hamas's military offensive in June 2007 crushed Fatah's political and military positions throughout the Gaza Strip. West Bank security is maintained by Israel although some now argue for cooperation with Fatah units, which have lately received yet more training and arms from the U.S. military.

Hamas's 2006 electoral victory in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority's control of the West Bank demonstrate how anti-Israeli terrorism is the preferred ideology used to "govern" Palestinian society. This also explains Gaza's transformation into a united, terrorist front that has brought together many groups otherwise at odds with one another, including Al-Qaeda, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, an "Iranian embassy," and many more.

----------------------------------

Asaf Romirowsky
Middle East Quarterly

http://www.romirowsky.com/6560/the-palestinian-military

The cache seized from the cargo ship MV Francop included approximately 3,000 Katyusha rockets, 3,000 recoilless gun shells, 9,000 mortar bombs, 20,000 grenades, and more than half a million rounds of small-arms ammunition.

The U.S. says the ship's seizure proves Iran is violating a 2007 enacted in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war.

According to Israel's deputy Navy chief, Brig. Gen. Rani Ben-Yehuda, the quantity of arms seized would have been enough to supply Hizballah for a month or more of fighting against Israel. "The quantity of arms seized on the weapons ship Francop is 10 times or even more than the quantity of weapons on the Karine-A ship," Ben-Yehuda said.

The Karine-A was a ship loaded with 50 tons of advanced weaponry from Iran bound for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. It was captured in the Red Sea by the Israeli Navy and Air Force on January 3, 2002.

Aboard the MV Francop last week, rockets were packed into cases marked "Parts of Bulldozer" and "Construction Equipment." The Israelis found containers stuffed with polyethylene sacks to camouflage munitions. Farsi and English markings on the sacks revealed that the polyethylene was produced by Iran's National Petrochemical Company.

"Some of the weapons were high-quality, chiefly 60mm, 81mm and 120mm mortar shells produced between 2007 and 2009," reported Israel's Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC). "The large quantity of rockets (about 2,800) equaled about 70% of those fired during the second Lebanon war (July 2006), when Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 rockets of various types into Israeli territory, most of them 122mm rockets similar to those found on board the ship."

In addition to the Karine-A, the ITIC lists some other recent examples of publicly exposed Iranian efforts to smuggle weapons to terrorist groups and/or state sponsors of terrorism, which include:

*In December 2003 and January 2004, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards flew weapons to Hizballah through Syria. Humanitarian assistance was flown into southern Iran for earthquake victims. The Iranian government used the return flights to Damascus to smuggle arms to Hizballah.

*In May 2007, an Iranian train carrying rocket launchers and ammunition, mortar shells and light arms was intercepted in Turkey. The weapons were intended for Hizballah.

*In January 2009, a weapons shipment was captured in Cyprus on a Cypriot ship that had been leased by an Iranian shipping company. The vessel contained anti-tank weapons, artillery, and materials for manufacturing rockets.

*Also in January 2009, Israeli planes attacked a convoy of 20 trucks in Sudan; the trucks were loaded with weapons headed for Gaza. The weapons included long-range Fajr missiles that could reach Tel Aviv from Gaza.

*In October 2009 an Indian ship which sailed from Iran flying a German flag was supposed to unload eight containers in Egypt. Following a warning from German authorities, the vessel diverted to Malta, where it was discovered to be carrying bullets and materials to manufacture weapons - apparently linked to Syria.

Read more about Tehran's weapons smuggling to terrorist organizations here and here and here.

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The wave of terror that hit the kingdom was largely contained following a number of executions, mass arrests, close supervision of web sites, mosque activity, and religious clerics, and the process of "rehabilitating" terror activists - in itself a somewhat controversial program.

The relative calm since 2006 came to an end in August 2009 with a failed attempt by the Yemenite "branch" of al-Qaeda to harm a member of the Saudi royal family, the first such attempt since the terror organization began to operate in the kingdom. The target, who was lightly wounded, was the son of the third in line to the throne and a leading figure of the kingdom's anti-terrorism operations, Prince Mahmad Ben-Naif.

An attack that was prevented in October also involved a Saudi citizen who came from Yemen, and he too appeared on the "85 most wanted" list released by the Saudi authorities in February 2009 (all except the two Yemenites were of Saudi origin). In the past year a number of activists connected to al-Qaeda operations in Hijaz were arrested, with explosives belts on them that were primed for use, arms, and other components used to produce explosive devices. In general, the main objectives of such operations are:

a.    A change in the pro-American policy, and expulsion of the American forces stationed in the Gulf states.

b.    The release of terrorists arrested in the Gulf states, or reprisals for past attacks on terrorists.

c.    The fall of regimes that "have distanced themselves from religion," to be replaced with "proper" regimes.

The Yemenite branch of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) comprises Yemenites and Saudis who found shelter in Yemen, reinforced by fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan, and activists released from Guatanamo. Members of the organization in Yemen enjoy relative freedom of movement in Saudi Arabia's backyard, mainly due to the inability of the country's central administration to effectively control areas outside the capital San'a.

Kuwait has also recently been faced with attempted terror attacks. Its security forces arrested a number of citizens who were suspected of planning to smuggle a truck full of explosives into the Camp Arifjan US military base south of Kuwait City, strike at the Kuwait security forces headquarters, and attack oil refining facilities. Newspapers in the Gulf, which reported on the attempted terror attack, claimed that the terror cell was captured as a result of information obtained during exposure of a sleeper cell in neighboring Bahrain.

It was also reported that the security forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) succeeded in thwarting a plan to blow up the tallest building in the world, Burj Dubai, and other buildings. It is not clear who is behind this attempt, but investigations are underway to ascertain if al-Qaeda affiliates were involved that received help from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards with a view to striking the financial heart of the Gulf.

This attempt reflects the strategy devised by al-Qaeda, to attack strategic and symbolic targets, and it may indicate that the UAE has been added to the list of its enemies. Indeed, thus far al-Qaeda has not marked the UAE as a target, probably because a significant part of its budget comes from donations from the UAE, and possibly also because UAE authorities largely turned a blind eye to its activities, in the hope that it would thereby prevent terror attacks at home. Recently it appears that the UAE government has changed its mode of operation and has begun to act against the organizations' funding sources. Not long ago, the UAE federal court sentenced an American businessman of Lebanese origin, on charges that he contributed to a charity organization identified with al-Qaeda, so that the latter could fire rockets into Israel.

In this context the Saudi-owned daily newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat claimed that another al-Qaeda cell in Iran is planning to carry out terror attacks on targets in the Gulf. The paper inferred that Iran is also involved in the attempt to assassinate Mahmad Bin-Naif on his departure from Yemen, noting that such a complex operation required the support of an intelligence organization of a foreign country.

Whether Iran initiated and encouraged the recent attempted attacks or turned a blind eye is not entirely clear. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran terror became a means of trying to enforce its policy and boost its influence in the Gulf. In most cases it was not possible to prove direct Iranian involvement and thus Iran could deny any connection with such activity, and alongside covert activity, could maintain open diplomatic relations with the Gulf states.

The latest attempted attacks follow several years in which the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, achieved some notable successes in the fight against terror. Around 330 al-Qaeda activities in Hijaz were tried and convicted (most received light sentences). This is the first time in the history of the kingdom that such judicial activity was carried out, via a new court that was established as part of the fight against terror. Improvements and adjustments have also been made in the kingdom's prison system - five new prisons have been opened, and the anti-terror units have been reinforced.

Although the latest changes provide enhanced means for fighting terror it is not clear how effectively the Saudi security forces will operate. It is no secret that their loyalty is questionable, and some of them even support ideas of al-Qaeda.

In addition, despite Saudi claims that the rehabilitation program, which provides former terrorists with housing solutions and employment, is a success story, there are other views on the situation.  In testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of America's National Intelligence Dennis Blair spoke out against this claim, saying that most of the rehabilitated terrorists were "small fry" while the main terrorists did not undergo any sort of rehabilitation process, and in any case do not forsake terror.

Nonetheless, Yemen also intends to adopt the Saudi model of terrorist rehabilitation, and with the aid of the United States, hopes to successfully absorb other former Guatanamo inmates. The Yemenite government's inability to ensure imprisonment of the 97 Yemenite detainees is today perceived as one of the obstacles to fulfilling President Obama's promise to close the prison by the end of the year.

Supporters of the "soft" strategy for combating terrorism in Saudi Arabia avoid tackling the long term solution for the problem, particularly because it requires wider political involvement, more cooperation from the religious establishment, a fairer distribution of oil wealth, and comprehensive reform in education. It is unclear if the kingdom is willing to undertake such changes, which may challenge the existing governmental system.

Many Saudis who until recently refused to accept that their country, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, has become a hotbed of terrorism, now better understand that they have long become its victims. To what extent do recent events represent a change in al-Qaeda's modus operandi in the Arabian Peninsula? It is too early to say. Even if the attacks escalate it is unlikely that they will present the regimes with an immediate threat, but they require effective handling and addressing the social, religious, and economic roots that feed terror.

We have recently been witness to a new US initiative launched by the Obama administration for dialogue with Russia that affects both the bilateral and global levels. The American proposal, which generated several top level meetings, including with presidents and foreign ministers, was apparently submitted to the Russian side as a comprehensive "package deal." If it materializes, this arrangement will yield a positive change in relations between Russia and the West and stands to have considerable implications for the international system, with an emphasis on the Middle East.

According to the previous policy, which was driven by superpower aspirations, Russia aimed to induce a confrontation in the international arena on three levels:

1. On the global level: alongside full integration in the international system, Russia pursued assertive and defiant activity against the United States and its allies in order to enhance its own status.
2. On the regional level: Russia aimed to displace the United States and further its own agenda, using a range of leveraging means. Naturally, the Middle East, which was the locus of cooperation with the Axis of Evil, featured strongly here.
3. On the "near abroad"/former Soviet Union (FSU) level: In this area, identified as the Russian interest in the area of the former Soviet Union, Russia is desperately resisting the efforts of the West to extend its influence eastwards.

The American initiative makes a reversal possible by generating conditions for positive dialogue with Russia, while offering proposals for solving most of the aforementioned problems based on far reaching concessions. However, along with the important concessions for Russia, it appears that the American proposal is submitted as a single unit encompassing all the issues, including those that are problematic - first and foremost Iran. There is a growing impression that this process has been successful and that the sides have agreed on most of the package, even though a number of issues are still to be settled.

As far as it is possible to assess, the arrangement incorporates the follow topics:

• Understanding with regard to the agreement on limiting strategic arms, which is due to come into force this December (START).
• US forgoing of its anti-missile defense in Eastern Europe.
• Cooperation on containment of the Iranian nuclear program, including the transfer of uranium for enrichment in Russia.
• The inclusion of Russia in political activity in the Middle East, alongside the United States, in all main areas. An indication of this is agreement to hold a conference on Middle East affairs in Moscow.
• Recognition of Russia's status in the domain of the former Soviet Union. This topic has been defined as "a solution for conflict in the post-Soviet expanse."
• Russian involvement in NATO operations, which relates to assistance (aerial passage) for the US in Afghanistan, cooperation on a policy of restraint on North Korea, and Russian involvement in a new plan for European security.

This arrangement apparently includes American concessions that are important to Russia and that substantially upgrade Moscow's international standing. In turn, Russia is expected to reward American flexibility by softening its stance on the Iranian nuclear program as well as cooperating in the war on terror. This constitutes an important American achievement, but it appears that it is the Russians who have gained a diplomatic victory in proving that the Russian strategy of the last few years has paid off. Without tangible means, Russia has managed to improve its international standing and achieve most of its objectives.

With regard to the implications of the arrangement for Middle East affairs, it seems that Russia has positioned itself in a new and significantly improved position compared with the past. This is a function of two main issues. The first is the Iranian issue, which will enable Russia to gain important leverage because of its role in the agreement on uranium enrichment. At the same time, Russia's inclusion in an arrangement with the West highlights the familiar Russian dilemma: choosing between cooperation with the international community and the option of full cooperation with Iran and its partners in the Axis of Evil. Russia still views Iran as an important partner, a regional power, a potential leader of the future Muslim world, and as such, a country capable of furthering Russian global objectives. This makes it difficult to apply the Iranian clause of the American-Russian arrangement. Yet given inconsistent Iranian behavior and Russia's tough bargaining with the Americans, Russia has gained a sense of self-importance. In any case, Russia is ensured a central role in future talks with the Iranians.

The second issue concerns the new and enhanced standing that Russia is expected to gain in all areas of the Middle East political process. A conference in Moscow on the Middle East will constitute a clear expression of this. According to Russian foreign minister Lavrov, the conference will incorporate the Israeli-Palestinian channel and the Syrian and Lebanese channels. This is naturally also contingent on other developments, including Israel's willingness to cooperate.

These two areas provide Russia with relative advantages in forging an influential position with regard to Middle East affairs, and gaining a standing similar to that of the United States. Thus if the agreement is implemented, the Middle East may see a strategic transformation in the region.

This script confronts Israel with a new reality. Instead of the familiar regional picture, a different complex of problems and ways to seek solutions are expected to emerge. In such a situation, the success of the new direction is largely dependent on Israel's position, largely because Russia identifies it as one of the main regional players, both vis-à-vis the Iranian issue and the political process. Russia's active participation in the political process creates additional pressure on Israel with regard to the price and conditions of any future arrangements it makes.

It appears that Russia has lately been working on creating an image of a fair and efficient broker that is acceptable to all the sides in the region, and indeed, it has scored points in this area. A certain degree of tension that has recently emerged in the bilateral relationship with Israel may be attributable, beyond an expression of Russian dissatisfaction with Israel's conduct, to Russia's interest in demonstrating an "objective" position.

The United States has put together a clever proposal, offered as a single package with concessions to Russia that also obligates Russia to make corresponding concessions, primarily on the Iranian issue. For Russia this is a considerable achievement and an impressive diplomatic success that enabled it to achieve strategic objectives without what would otherwise presumably be considered necessary tools. The arrangement grants Russia a position in the Middle East with considerable future influence, potentially similar to that of the United States. As such, this constitutes a change that can be defined as strategic, and it requires a proper, thoughtful response by Israel and other relevant actors.

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The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.

NAIROBI, Kenya, November 11 (Compass Direct News) - About 40 Muslim extremists with machetes and clubs tried to break into a Sunday worship service outside Uganda's capital city of Kampala on Nov. 1, leaving a member of the congregation with several injuries and damaging the church building.

Eyewitnesses said the extremist mob tried to storm into World Possessor's Church International in Namasuba at 11 a.m. as the church worshipped.

"The church members were taken by a big surprise, as this happened during worship time," said Pastor Henry Zaake.

"It began with an unusual noise coming from outside, and soon I saw the bricks falling away one by one. Immediately I knew that it was an attack from the Muslims who had earlier sent signals of an imminent attack."

The pastor said the disturbance brought the worship service to a standstill.

"There was a tug-of-war at the entrance to the church as members tried to thwart the Muslim aggression from making headway inside the church," he told Compass.

A member of the congregation who was taking photos of the worship service - and then the attack - was beaten, sustaining several injuries, church leaders said. He was later taken to a nearby clinic for treatment. During the pandemonium, some church members were able to escape through a rear door.

Pastor Umar Mulinde added that nearby residents helped repel the attack.

"At the scene of the incident were rowdy Muslims with machetes and clubs ready to destroy the church," Pastor Mulinde said. "The good neighbors of the church also came in, and we were able to overpower [the assailants]."

Police arrived and put a stop to the assault, but officers did not arrest anyone, church leaders said.

"We have reported the matter to the central police station, and we are surprised that no action has been taken," Pastor Zaake said. "So far no person has been arrested as a result of this mayhem. It is as if the police are not concerned about our security and lives."

Many in the church are now living in fear, he said, noting that last Sunday (Nov. 8), attendance decreased from 250 to 100 people.

"Since the attack we have been receiving a lot of threats from the Muslims," Pastor Zaake said. "There is a conspiracy that we can't understand. This trend really gives me sleepless nights."

Area Muslims have long opposed the existence of the church in Namasuba, complaining that church members try to convert area Muslims. Christian sources said the initial pretext for damaging the church building was that its outdoor stairway encroached on the alley; the estimated US$535 (1 million Uganda shillings) in damages were limited to the stairway. The sources said that when the complaint of the stairway encroaching on the alley fell on deaf ears, local Muslim and community leaders criticized the church for making too much noise.

Namasuba is predominantly Islamic, with some estimates of Muslim adherents going as high as 80 percent of the population.

Pastor Zaake said area Muslims have been holding meetings at night, which he suspects concern plans to paralyze Christian activities.

"It looks like they are planning for another attack, especially in light of the threatening messages I have been receiving on my mobile phone from anonymous senders," a worried Pastor Zaake told Compass by phone.

The church has been meeting in Namasuba since March. It is located four kilometers from Kampala on a quarter-acre parcel.

Although the Ugandan constitution guarantees religious freedom, authorities hardly prosecute Muslim attacks against Christians, church leaders said.

"The police silence on the whole issue is worrying and leaves a lot to be desired," Pastor Zaake said.

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Additionally, the article encourages violence against public figures such as "a government minister" and "media figures, and writers who insult the religion."

Al Qaeda's open invitation to anyone to commit violent acts on Western soil is an indication that so-called "lone wolf" attackers, may not be so alone after all. While individuals plotting attacks may not hold a leadership position or even have interacted with anyone directly tied to the organization, those who carry out actions in line with al Qaeda's message may be considered a part of the loosely organized outer fringe of the terrorist group.

Al Qaeda's violent instructions should be taken seriously considering that many here in the U.S. already relate to the terrorist organization's grievances and that others pledge allegiance to al Qaeda itself.

Just this year the U.S. has seen an instance of an individual who was structurally disconnected from al Qaeda cite allegiance to al Qaeda's message as a reason for planning attacks. Hosam Smadi, a Jordanian citizen, was charged with attempting to blow up a Dallas skyscraper in September 2009. Smadi said that his intention in committing this act was to serve as a soldier for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. FBI agents posing undercover as members of an al Qaeda sleeper cell were introduced to Smadi at which time he told them that he came to the U.S. for the specific purpose of committing "jihad for the sake of God."

In other cases, radicalized people did commit violent acts on U.S. soil without linking themselves to al Qaeda. However, the grievances they mentioned to authorities are exactly those grievances al Qaeda lists as reasons for those in Western countries to detonate bombs - in particular that the U.S. is at war in Muslim countries.

One Muslim convert, Abdulhakem Muhammad, shot two soldiers outside an Army recruiting center in Arkansas in June 2009. Muhammad told investigating detectives that he was mad at the U.S. military because of what they had done to Muslims in the past.

James Cromitie (a.k.a. Abdul Rahman) was arrested for plotting to detonate explosives near a synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx and to shoot military planes located at the New York Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, NY. Cromitie told an FBI informant that he was upset about the war in Afghanistan and that many Muslims had been killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan by the U.S. Military.

Similarly in the case of Michael Finton (a.k.a. Talib Islam), accused of plotting to use a truck bomb to blow up the federal building in Springfield, Illinois, Finton discussed targeting locations in the United States and made videos in which he rationalized the attacks and accused the U.S. of being at war with Islam.

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Some in Britain cannot conceive that a suicide bomber could be a hero of Islam. Since 7/7 many have made statements to attempt to explain what seems to them a contradiction in terms. Since the violence cannot be denied, their only course is to argue that the connection with Islam is invalid. The deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Brian Paddick, said that 'Islam and terrorists are two words that do not go together.' His boss, the Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, asserted that there is nothing wrong with being a fundamentalist Muslim.

But surely we should give enough respect to those who voluntarily lay down their lives to accept what they themselves say about their motives. If they say they do it in the name of Islam, we must believe them. Is it not the height of illiberalism and arrogance to deny them the right to define themselves?

On 8 July the London-based Muslim Weekly unblushingly published a lengthy opinion article by Abid Ullah Jan entitled 'Islam, Faith and Power'. The gist of the article is that Muslims should strive to gain political and military power over non-Muslims, that warfare is obligatory for all Muslims, and that the Islamic state, Islam and Sharia (Islamic law) should be established throughout the world. All is supported with quotations from the Koran. It concludes with a veiled threat to Britain. The bombings the previous day were a perfect illustration of what Jan was advocating, and the editor evidently felt no need to withdraw the article or to apologise for it. His newspaper is widely read and distributed across the UK.

By far the majority of Muslims today live their lives without recourse to violence, for the Koran is like a pick-and-mix selection. If you want peace, you can find peaceable verses. If you want war, you can find bellicose verses. You can find verses which permit only defensive jihad, or you can find verses to justify offensive jihad.

You can even find texts which specifically command terrorism, the classic one being Q8:59-60, which urges Muslims to prepare themselves to fight non-Muslims, 'Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies' (A. Yusuf Ali's translation). Pakistani Brigadier S.K. Malik's book The Quranic Concept of War is widely used by the military of various Muslim countries. Malik explains Koranic teaching on strategy: 'In war our main objective is the opponent's heart or soul, our main weapon of offence against this objective is the strength of our own souls, and to launch such an attack, we have to keep terror away from our own hearts.... Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision on the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose on him.'

If you permit yourself a little judicious cutting, the range of choice in Koranic teaching is even wider. A verse one often hears quoted as part of the 'Islam is peace' litany allegedly runs along the lines: 'If you kill one soul it is as if you have killed all mankind.' But the full and unexpurgated version of Q5:32 states: 'If anyone slew a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the whole people.' The very next verse lists a selection of savage punishments for those who fight the Muslims and create 'mischief' (or in some English translations 'corruption') in the land, punishments which include execution, crucifixion or amputation. What kind of 'mischief in the land' could merit such a reaction? Could it be interpreted as secularism, democracy and other non-Islamic values in a land? Could the 'murder' be the killing of Muslims in Iraq? Just as importantly, do the Muslims who keep quoting this verse realise what a deception they are imposing on their listeners?

It is probably true that in every faith ordinary people will pick the parts they like best and practise those, while the scholars will work out an official version. In Islam the scholars had a particularly challenging task, given the mass of contradictory texts within the Koran. To meet this challenge they developed the rule of abrogation, which states that wherever contradictions are found, the later-dated text abrogates the earlier one. To elucidate further the original intention of Mohammed, they referred to traditions (hadith) recording what he himself had said and done. Sadly for the rest of the world, both these methods led Islam away from peace and towards war. For the peaceable verses of the Koran are almost all earlier, dating from Mohammed's time in Mecca, while those which advocate war and violence are almost all later, dating from after his flight to Medina. Though jihad has a variety of meanings, including a spiritual struggle against sin, Mohammed's own example shows clearly that he frequently interpreted jihad as literal warfare and himself ordered massacre, assassination and torture. From these sources the Islamic scholars developed a detailed theology dividing the world into two parts, Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, with Muslims required to change Dar al-Harb into Dar al-Islam either through warfare or da'wa (mission).

So the mantra 'Islam is peace' is almost 1,400 years out of date. It was only for about 13 years that Islam was peace and nothing but peace. From 622 onwards it became increasingly aggressive, albeit with periods of peaceful co-existence, particularly in the colonial period, when the theology of war was not dominant. For today's radical Muslims - just as for the mediaeval jurists who developed classical Islam - it would be truer to say 'Islam is war'. One of the most radical Islamic groups in Britain, al-Ghurabaa, stated in the wake of the two London bombings, 'Any Muslim that denies that terror is a part of Islam is kafir.' A kafir is an unbeliever (i.e., a non-Muslim), a term of gross insult.

In the words of Mundir Badr Haloum, a liberal Muslim who lectures at a Syrian university, 'Ignominious terrorism exists, and one cannot but acknowledge its being Islamic.' While many individual Muslims choose to live their personal lives only by the (now abrogated) peaceable verses of the Koran, it is vain to deny the pro-war and pro-terrorism doctrines within their religion.

Could it be that the young men who committed suicide were neither on the fringes of Muslim society in Britain, nor following an eccentric and extremist interpretation of their faith, but rather that they came from the very core of the Muslim community and were motivated by a mainstream interpretation of Islam?

Muslims who migrated to the UK came initially for economic reasons, seeking employment. But over the last 50 years their communities have evolved away from assimilation with the British majority towards the creation of separate and distinct entities, mimicking the communalism of the British Raj. As a Pakistani friend of mine who lives in London said recently, 'The British gave us all we ever asked for; why should we complain?' British Muslims now have Sharia in areas of finance and mortgages; halal food in schools, hospitals and prisons; faith schools funded by the state; prayer rooms in every police station in London; and much more. This process has been assisted by the British government through its philosophy of multiculturalism, which has allowed some Muslims to consolidate and create a parallel society in the UK.

The Muslim community now inhabits principally the urban centres of England as well as some parts of Scotland and Wales. It forms a spine running down the centre of England from Bradford to London, with ribs extending east and west. It is said that within 10 to 15 years most British cities in these areas will have Muslim-majority populations, and will be under local Islamic political control, with the Muslim community living under Sharia.

What happens after this stage depends on which of the two main religious traditions among Pakistani-background British Muslims gains the ascendancy. The Barelwi majority believe in a slow evolution, gradually consolidating their Muslim societies, and finally achieving an Islamic state. The Deobandi minority argue for a quicker process using politics and violence to achieve the same result. Ultimately, both believe in the goal of an Islamic state in Britain where Muslims will govern their own affairs and, as the finishing touch, everyone else's affairs as well. Islamism is now the dominant voice in contemporary Islam, and has become the seedbed of the radical movements. It is this that Sir Ian Blair has not grasped. For some time now the British government has been quoting a figure of 1.6 million for the Muslim population. Muslims themselves claim around 3 million, and this is likely to be far nearer to the truth. The growth of the Muslim community comes from their high birth-rate, primary immigration, and asylum-seekers both official and unofficial. There are also conversions to Islam.

The violence which is endemic in Muslim societies such as Pakistan is increasingly present in Britain's Muslim community. Already we have violence by Pakistani Muslims against Kurdish Muslims, by Muslims against non-Muslims living among them (Caribbean people in the West Midlands, for example), a rapid growth in honour killings, and now suicide bombings. It is worth noting that many conflicts around the world are not internal to the Muslim community but external, as Muslims seek to gain territorial control, for example, in south Thailand, the southern Philippines, Kashmir, Chechnya and Palestine. Is it possible that a conflict of this nature could occur in Britain?

Muslims must stop this self-deception. They must with honesty recognise the violence that has existed in their history in the same way that Christians have had to do, for Christianity has a very dark past. Some Muslims have, with great courage, begun to do this.

Secondly, they must look at the reinterpretation of their texts, the Koran, hadith and Sharia, and the reformation of their faith. Mundir Badr Haloum has described this as 'exorcising' the terrorism from Islam. Mahmud Muhammad Taha argued for a distinction to be drawn between the Meccan and the Medinan sections of the Koran. He advocated a return to peaceable Meccan Islam, which he argued is applicable to today, whereas the bellicose Medinan teachings should be consigned to history. For taking this position he was tried for apostasy, found guilty and executed by the Sudanese government in 1985. Another modernist reformer was the Pakistani Fazlur Rahman, who advocated the 'double movement'; i.e., understanding Koranic verses in their context, their ratio legis, and then using the philosophy of the Koran to interpret that in a modern, social and moral sense. Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd, an Egyptian professor who argued similarly that the Koran and hadith should be interpreted according to the context in which they originated, was charged with apostasy, found guilty in June 1995 and ordered to separate from his wife.

The US-based Free Muslims Coalition, which was set up after 9/11 to promote a modern and secular version of Islam, has proposed the following:

1. A re-interpretation of Islam for the 21st century, where terrorism is not justified under any circumstances.

2. Separation of religion and state.

3. Democracy as the best form of government.

4. Secularism in all forms of political activity.

5. Equality for women.

6. Religion to be a personal relationship between the individual and his or her God, not to be forced on anyone.

This tempting vision of an Islam reformed along such lines is unlikely to be achieved except by a long and painful process of small steps. What might these be and how can we make a start? One step would be, as urged by the Prince of Wales, that every Muslim should 'condemn these atrocities [the London bombings] and root out those among them who preach and practise such hatred and bitterness'. Universal condemnation of suicide bombers instead of acclamation as heroes would indeed be an excellent start.

Mansoor Ijaz has suggested a practical three-point action plan:

1. Forbid radical hate-filled preaching in British mosques. Deport imams who fail to comply.

2. Scrutinise British Islamic charities to identify those that fund terrorism. Prevent them receiving more than 10 per cent of their income from overseas.

3. Form community-watch groups comprising Muslim citizens to contribute useful information on fanatical Muslims to the authorities.

To this could be added Muslim acceptance of a secular society as the basis for their religious existence, an oath of allegiance to the Crown which would override their allegiance to their co-religionists overseas, and deliberate steps to move out of their ghetto-style existence both physically and psychologically.

For the government, the time has come to accept Trevor Phillips's statement that multiculturalism is dead. We need to rediscover and affirm a common British identity. This would impinge heavily on the future development of faith schools, which should now be stopped.

Given the fate of some earlier would-be reformers, perhaps King Abdullah of Jordan or a leader of his stature might have the best chance of initiating a process of modernist reform. The day before the bombings he was presiding over a conference of senior scholars from eight schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and, amazingly, they issued a statement endorsing fatwas forbidding any Muslim from those eight schools to be declared an apostate. So reform is possible. The only problem with this particular action is that it may have protected Muslim leaders from being killed by dissident Muslims, but it negated a very helpful fatwa which had been issued in March by the Spanish Islamic scholars declaring Osama bin Laden an apostate. Could not the King re-convene his conference and ask them to issue a fatwa banning violence against non-Muslims also? This would extend the self-preservation of the Muslim community to the whole non-Muslim world.

Such reform - the changing of certain fairly central theological principles - will not be easy to achieve. It will be a long, hard road for Islam to get its house in order so that it can co-exist peacefully with the rest of society in the 21st century.
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Dr Patrick Sookhdeo is Director of the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity.