What is the Status of US Military Power?

Heritage Foundaton US Military Power

Heritage Foundation | 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength

A‌merica is a global power with global interests. Its military is meant first and foremost to ‌defend America from attack. Beyond that, it is meant to protect Americans abroad, allies, and the freedom to use international sea, air, and space while retaining the ability to engage in more than one major contingency at a time. America must be able not only to defend itself and its interests, but also to deter enemies and opportunists from taking action that would challenge U.S. interests, a capability that includes preventing the destabilization of a region and guarding against threats to the peace and security of America’s friends.

As noted in the 2015 Index, however, the U.S. does not have the right force to meet a two–major regional contingency (MRC) requirement and is not ready to carry out its duties effectively. Consequently, the U.S. risks seeing its interests increasingly challenged and the world order it has led since World War II undone.

How to Think About Sizing Military Power

Military power begins with the people and equipment used to conduct war: the weapons, tanks, ships, airplanes, and supporting tools such as communications systems that make it possible either for one group to impose its will on another or to prevent such an outcome from happening.

However, simply counting the number of people, tanks, or combat aircraft that the U.S. possesses would be irrelevant because it would lack context. For example, the U.S. Army might have 100 tanks, but to accomplish a specific military task, 1,000 or more tanks might be needed or none at all. It might be that the terrain on which a battle is fought is especially ill-suited to tanks or that the tanks one has are inferior to the enemy’s. The enemy could be quite adept at using tanks, or his tank operations might be integrated into a larger employment concept that leverages the supporting fires of infantry and airpower, whereas one’s own tanks are poorly maintained, the crews are ill-prepared, or one’s doctrine is irrelevant.

Success in war is partly a function of matching the tools of warfare to a specific task and employing those tools effectively in the conditions of the battle. Get these wrong—tools, objective, competency, or context—and you lose.

Another key element is the military’s capacity for conducting operations: how many of the right tools—people, tanks, planes, or ships—it has. One might have the right tools and know how to use them effectively but not have enough to win. Given that one cannot know with certainty beforehand just when, where, against whom, and for what reason a battle might be fought, determining how much capability is needed is an exercise of informed, but not certain, judgment.

Further, two different combatants can use the same set of tools in radically different ways to quite different effects. The concept of employment matters. Concepts are developed to account for numbers, capabilities, material readiness, and all sorts of other factors that enable or constrain one’s actions, such as whether one fights alone or alongside allies, on familiar or strange terrain, or with a large, well-equipped force or a small, poorly equipped force.

All of these factors and a multitude of others bear upon the outcome of any military contest. Military planners attempt to account for them when devising requirements, developing training and exercise plans, formulating war plans, and providing advice to the President in his role as Commander in Chief of U.S. military forces.

Measuring hard combat power in terms of its adequacy in capability, capacity, and readiness to defend U.S. vital interests is hard, especially in such a limited space as this Index, but it is not impossible. Regardless of the difficulty of determining the adequacy of one’s military forces, the Secretary of Defense and the military services have to make decisions every year when the annual defense budget request is submitted to Congress.

The adequacy of hard power is affected most directly by the resources the nation is willing to invest. While that investment decision is informed to a significant degree by an appreciation of threats to U.S. interests and the ability of a given defense portfolio to protect U.S. interests against such threats, it is not informed solely by such considerations; hence the importance of clarity and honesty in determining just what is needed in hard power and the status of such hard power from year to year.

Administrations take various approaches to determine the type and amount of military power needed and, by extension, the amount of money and other resources to commit to it. After defining the national interests to be protected, the Department of Defense can use worst-case scenarios to determine the maximum challenges the U.S. military might have to overcome. Another way is to redefine what constitutes a threat. By taking a different view of major actors as to whether they pose a meaningful threat and of the extent to which friends and allies have an ability to assist the U.S. in meeting security objectives, one can arrive at different conclusions about necessary military strength.

For example, one Administration might view China as a rising, belligerent power bent on dominating the Asia–Pacific. Another Administration might view China as an inherently peaceful, rising economic power, with the expansion of its military capabilities a natural occurrence commensurate with its strengthening status. The difference between these views can have a dramatic impact on how one thinks about U.S. defense requirements. So, too, can policymakers amplify or downplay risk to justify defense budget decisions.

There can also be strongly differing views on requirements for operational capacity. Does the country need enough for two major combat operations (MCOs) at roughly the same time or just enough for a single major operation plus some number of lesser cases? To what extent should “presence” tasks—the use of forces for routine engagement with partner countries or simply to be on hand in a region for crisis response—be additive to or a subset of a military force sized to handle two major regional conflicts? How much value should be assigned to advanced technologies as they are incorporated into the force?

Where to Start

There are references that one can use to help sort through the variables and arrive at a starting point for assessing the adequacy of today’s military posture: government studies and historical experience. The government occasionally conducts formal reviews meant to inform decisions on capabilities and capacities across the Joint Force relative to the threat environment (current and projected) and evolutions in operating conditions, the advancement of technologies, and aspects of U.S. interests that may call for one type of military response over another.

The 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), conducted by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, is one such frequently cited example. Secretary Aspin recognized “the dramatic changes that [had] occurred in the world as a result of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union…[altering] America’s security needs” and driving an imperative “to reassess all of our defense concepts, plans, and programs from the ground up.”1

The BUR formally established the requirement that U.S. forces should be able “to achieve decisive victory in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts [MRCs] and to conduct combat operations characterized by rapid response and a high probability of success, while minimizing the risk of significant American casualties.”2 Thus was formalized the two-MRC standard.

Dr. Daniel Gouré, in his 2015 Index essay “Building the Right Military for a New Era: The Need for an Enduring Analytic Framework,” noted that various Administrations have redefined force requirements based on their perceptions of what was necessary to protect U.S. interests.3 In an attempt to formalize the process, and perhaps to have a mechanism by which to exert influence on the executive branch in such matters,4 Congress mandated that each incoming Administration must conduct a comprehensive strategic review of the global security environment, articulate a relevant strategy suited to protecting and promoting U.S. security interests, and recommend an associated military force posture.

The Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have been conducted since 1997, accompanied in 1997, 2010, and 2014 by independent National Defense Panel (NDP) reports that have reviewed and commented on them. Both sets of documents purport to serve as key assessments, but analysts have come to minimize their value, regarding them as justifications for executive branch policy preferences (the QDR reports) or overly broad, generalized commentaries (the NDP reports) that lack substantive discussion about threats to U.S. interests, a credible strategy for dealing with them, and the actual ability of the U.S. military to meet national security requirements.

Correlation of Forces as a Factor in Force Sizing

During the Cold War, the U.S. used the Soviet threat as its primary reference for what it needed in hard power. At that time, the correlation of forces—a comparison of one force against another to determine strengths and weaknesses—was highly symmetrical. U.S. planners compared tanks, aircraft, and ships against their direct counterparts in the opposing force. These comparison assessments drove the sizing, characteristics, and capabilities of fleets, armies, and air forces.

The evolution of guided, precision munitions and the rapid technological advancements in surveillance and targeting systems, however, have made comparing combat power more difficult. What was largely a platform v. platform model has shifted somewhat to a munitions v. target model.

The proliferation of precise weaponry increasingly means that each round, bomb, rocket, missile, and even individual bullet (in some instances) can hit its intended target, thus decreasing the number of munitions needed to prosecute an operation. It also means that the lethality of an operating environment increases significantly for the people and platforms involved. We are now at the point where one must consider how many “smart munitions” the enemy has when thinking about how many platforms and people are needed to win a combat engagement instead of focusing primarily on how many ships or airplanes the enemy can bring to bear against one’s own force.5

In one sense, increased precision and the technological advances now being incorporated into U.S. weapons, platforms, and operating concepts make it possible to do far more with fewer assets than ever before. Platform signature reduction (stealth) makes it harder for the enemy to find and target them, while the increased precision of weapons makes it possible for fewer platforms to hit many more targets. Additionally, the ability of the U.S. Joint Force to harness computers, modern telecommunications, space-based platforms—such as for surveillance, communications, positioning-navigation-timing (PNT) support from GPS satellites—and networked operations potentially means that smaller forces can have far greater effect in battle than at any other time in history. But these same advances also enable enemy forces. And certain military functions—such as seizing, holding, and occupying territory—may require a certain number of soldiers no matter how state-of-the-art their equipment may be.

With smaller forces, each individual element of the force represents a greater percentage of its combat power. Each casualty or equipment loss takes a larger toll on the ability of the force to sustain high-tempo, high-intensity combat operations over time, especially if the force is dispersed across a wide theater or across multiple theaters of operation.

As advanced technology has become more affordable, it has become more accessible for nearly any actor, state or non-state. Consequently, it may be that the outcomes of future wars will pivot to a much greater degree on the skill of the forces and their capacity to sustain operations over time than they will on some great disparity in technology. If so, readiness and capacity will take on greater importance than absolute advances in capability.

All of this illustrates the difficulties of and need for exercising judgment in assessing the adequacy of America’s military power. Yet without such an assessment, all that we are left with are the quadrennial strategic reviews (which are subject to filtering and manipulation to suit policy interests); annual budget submissions (which typically favor desired military programs at presumed levels of affordability and are therefore necessarily budget-constrained); and leadership posture statements that often simply align with executive branch policy priorities.

The U.S. Joint Force and the Art of War

This section of the Index, on military capabilities, assesses the adequacy of the United States’ defense posture as it pertains to a conventional understanding of “hard power,” defined as the ability of American military forces to engage and defeat an enemy’s forces in battle at a scale commensurate with the vital national interests of the U.S. While some hard truths in military affairs are appropriately addressed by math and science, others are not. Speed, range, probability of detection, and radar cross-section are examples of quantifiable characteristics that can be measured. Specific future instances in which U.S. military power will be needed, the competency of the enemy, the political will to sustain operations in the face of mounting deaths and destruction, and the absolute amount of strength needed to win are matters of judgment and experience, but they nevertheless affect how large and capable a force one might need.

In conducting the assessment, we accounted for both quantitative and qualitative aspects of military forces, informed by an experience-based understanding of military operations and the expertise of external reviewers.

Military effectiveness is as much an art as it is a science. Specific military capabilities represented in weapons, platforms, and military units can be used individually to some effect. Practitioners of war, however, have learned that combining the tools of war in various ways and orchestrating their tactical employment in series or simultaneously can dramatically amplify the effectiveness of the force committed to battle.

Employment concepts are exceedingly hard to measure in any quantitative way, but their value as critical contributors in the conduct of war is undeniable. How they are utilized is very much an art-of-war matter, learned through experience over time.

What Is Not Being Assessed

In assessing the current status of the military forces, this Index uses the primary references used by the military services themselves when they discuss their ability to employ hard combat power. The Army’s unit of measure is the brigade combat team (BCT), while the Marine Corps structures itself by battalions. For the Navy, it is the number of ships in its combat fleet, and the Air Force’s most consistent reference is total number of aircraft, sometimes broken down into the two primary sub-types of fighters and bombers.

Obviously, this is not the totality of service capabilities, and it certainly is not everything needed for war, but these measures can be viewed as surrogate measures that subsume or represent the vast number of other things that make these “units of measure” possible and effective in battle. There is an element of proportionality or ratio related to these measures that drives other aspects of force sizing. For example:

When planning air operations, the Air Force looks at the targets to be serviced and the nature of the general operation to be supported and then accounts for aircraft and munitions needed (type and quantity) and the availability and characteristics of airfields relevant to the operation. From this, they calculate sorties, distances, flight hours, fuel consumption, number of aircraft in a given piece of airspace, and a host of other pieces of information to determine how many aerial refueling tankers will be needed.

Joint Force detailed planning for operations determines how much equipment, manpower, and supplies need to be moved from one point to another and how much more will be needed to sustain operations: Logistics is a very quantitative business.

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) calculates the amount of lift required in cargo planes, sealift shipping, long-haul road movements, and trains.

The Marine Corps operationally thinks in terms of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) that are composed of command, ground, air, and logistics elements. The size of a MAGTF varies depending on the mission to be accomplished, but the nucleus is normally (though not always) the ground combat element that typically ranges from a battalion to a division. The amount of airpower, logistics support, and transportation (amphibious, sealift, and airlift) required to execute the operation extends from there.

The Navy thinks in terms of the number of surface combatants, the nature of operations, and proximity to ports to drive planning for all of the combat logistics force vessels that are needed to make it happen.

The Army provides a host of “common user support” capabilities to the overall force that can include operating ports, theater-wide trucking and rail operations, large-scale fuel and ammunition storage and distribution, engineering and construction services, and general supply support.

Institutional elements like recruiting are necessary to generate the force in the first place, the multitude of installations at which units are based, training facilities, acquisition workforce, and the military’s medical infrastructure.

The point here is that the military spear has a great deal of shaft that makes it possible for the tip to locate, close with, and destroy its target, and there is a rough proportionality between shaft and spear tip. Thus, in assessing the basic units of measure for combat power, one can get a sense of what is likely needed in the combat support, combat service support, and supporting establishment echelons. The scope of this Index does not extend to analysis of everything that makes hard power possible; it focuses on the status of the hard power itself.

This assessment also does not account for the Reserve and Guard components of the services; it focuses only on the Active component. Again, the element of proportion or ratio figures prominently. Each service determines the balance among its Active, Reserve, and National Guard elements (only the Army and Air Force have Guard elements; the Navy and Marine Corps do not) based on factors that include cost of the respective elements, availability for operational employment, time needed to respond to an emergent crisis, the allocation of roles between the elements, and political considerations.6 This assessment looks at the baseline requirement for a given amount of combat power that is readily available for use in a major combat operation—something that is usually associated with the Active components of each service.

The Defense Budget and Strategic Guidance

As for the defense budget, ample discussion of budget issues is scattered throughout (mainly as they pertain to acquisition programs), but the budget itself—whether for the military services individually, the Joint Force as a whole, or the totality of the defense establishment—is actually a reflection of the importance that the U.S. places on the modernity, capacity, and readiness of the force rather than a measure of the capability of the force itself. In other words, the budget itself does not tell us much about the posture of the U.S. military.

The baseline budget for defense in FY 2015 was $522 billion, which paid for the forces (manpower, equipment, training); enabling capabilities (things like transportation, satellites, defense intelligence, and research and development); and institutional support (bases and stations, facilities, recruiting, and the like). The baseline budget does not pay for the cost of ongoing operations, which is captured in supplemental funding known as OCO (overseas contingency operations).

It is true that absent a significant threat to the survival of the country, the U.S. will always balance expenditures on defense with spending in all of the other areas of government activity that it thinks are necessary or desirable. Some have argued that a defense budget indexed to a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is a reasonable reference, but a fixed percentage of GDP does not accurately reflect national security requirements per se any more than the size of the budget alone correlates to levels of capability. It is possible that a larger defense budget could be associated with less military capability if the money were allocated inappropriately or spent wastefully, and the fact that the economy changes over time does not necessarily mean that defense spending should increase or decrease in lockstep by default.

Ideally, defense requirements are determined by identifying national interests that might need to be protected with military power; assessing the nature of threats to those interests and what would be needed to defeat those threats (and how much that would cost); and then determining what the country can afford (or is willing) to spend. Any difference between assessed requirements and affordable levels of spending on defense would constitute risk to U.S. security interests.

This Index enthusiastically adopts this latter approach: interests, threats, requirements, resulting force, and associated budget. Spending less than the amount needed to maintain a two-MRC force results in policy debates over where to accept risk: force modernization, the capacity to conduct large-scale or multiple simultaneous operations, or force readiness.

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The decision to fund national defense commensurate with interests and prevailing threats is a policy decision reflecting national priorities and acceptance of risk. This Index assesses the ability of the nation’s military forces to protect vital national security interests within the world as it is so that the debate over funding hard power is better informed.

In fiscal year (FY) 2015, debate about how much funding to allocate to defense was affected by a larger political debate that pitted those who wanted to see an overall reduction in federal spending against those who pushed for higher levels of spending for defense and those who wanted to see any increase in defense spending matched by commensurate increases in domestic spending. Efforts to repeal or substantially modify the Budget Control Act (BCA) were stymied by those who feared losing a mechanism that disciplines federal spending. Yet there appears to be a consensus that more money is needed for defense, given the BCA requests for FY 2016 funding from the White House and both chambers of Congress.

The FY 2015 defense budget was only $1 billion more than the FY 2014 budget. Adjusted for inflation, this is actually a 1 percent cut. The President’s budget request for FY 2016 was $561 billion, which would represent an almost 6 percent real increase over FY 2015. For comparison, President Obama’s 2012 defense budget, the last under former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, proposed spending $624 billion on defense in FY 2015. A bipartisan consensus, as seen in the National Defense Panel report in 2014, has identified the so-called Gates budget as the minimum the United States should be spending on national defense.7 As seen in Chart 3, the FY 2015 enacted budget and the FY 2016 budget proposal are well below this minimum.

The restrictions placed on defense spending by the BCA continue to be a major concern of the military service chiefs, who have consistently testified about the damage these restrictions are causing to readiness, modernization, and capacity for operations. As FY 2015 ended, the budget debates about FY 2016 had not been resolved, but it appears unlikely that any resolution will bring the national defense budget close to even the minimum levels proposed by the Gates budget.

“Purpose” as a Driver in Force Sizing

The Joint Force is used for a wide range of purposes, only one of which is major combat operations. Fortunately, such events have been rare, averaging roughly 15–20 years between occurrences.8 In between (and even during) such occurrences, the military is used in support of regional engagement, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and humanitarian assistance, as well as providing support to civil authorities and U.S. diplomacy.

The U.S. Unified Combatant Commands, or COCOMS (EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRICOM), all have annual and long-term plans through which they engage with countries in their assigned regions. These engagements range from very small unit training events with the forces of a single partner country to larger bilateral and sometimes multilateral military exercises. In 2015, these engagements included training and assisting Iraqi military forces and participating in joint training exercises with NATO members. Such events help to establish working relationships with other countries, acquire a more detailed understanding of regional political–military dynamics and on-the-ground conditions in areas of interest, and signal U.S. security interests to friends and competitors.

To support such COCOM efforts, the services provide forces that are based permanently in respective regions or that operate in them temporarily on a rotational basis. To make these regional rotations possible, the services must maintain a base force sufficiently large to train, deploy, support, receive back, and make ready again a stream of units ideally numerous enough to meet validated COCOM demand.

The ratio between time spent at home and time spent away on deployment for any given unit is known as OPTEMPO (operational tempo), and each service attempts to maintain a ratio that both gives units enough time to educate, train, and prepare their forces and allows the individuals in a unit to maintain some semblance of a healthy home and family life. This ensures that units are fully prepared for the next deployment cycle and that servicemembers do not become “burned out” or suffer adverse consequences in their personal lives because of excessive deployment time.

Experience has shown that a ratio of at least 3:1 is sustainable, meaning three periods of time at home for every period deployed. (If a unit is to be out for six months, it will be home for 18 months before deploying again.) Obviously, a service needs a sufficient number of people, units, ships, and planes to support such a ratio. If peacetime engagement were the primary focus for the Joint Force, the services could size their forces to support these forward-based and forward-deployed demands.

Thus, the size of the total force must necessarily be much larger than any sampling of its use at any point in time.

In contrast, sizing a force for major combat operations is an exercise informed by history—how much force was needed in previous wars—and then shaped and refined by analysis of current threats, a range of plausible scenarios, and expectations about what the U.S. can do given training, equipment, employment concept, and other factors. The defense establishment must then balance “force sizing” between COCOM requirements for presence and engagement with the amount thought necessary to win in likely war scenarios.

Inevitably, compromises are made that account for how much military the country is willing to buy. Generally speaking:

  • The Army sizes to major warfighting requirements.
  • The Marine Corps focuses on crisis response demands and the ability to contribute to one major war.
  • The Air Force attempts to strike a balance that accounts for historically based demand across the spectrum since air assets are shifted fairly easily from one theater of operations to another (“easily” being a relative term when compared to the challenge of shifting large land forces), and any peacetime engagement typically requires some level of air support.
  • The Navy is driven by global presence requirements. To meet COCOM requirements for a continuous fleet presence at sea, the Navy must have three to four ships in order to have one on station. To illustrate with a simplistic example, a commander who wants one U.S. warship stationed off the coast of a hostile country needs the use of four ships from the fleet: one on station, one that left station and is traveling home, one that just left home and is traveling to station, and one that fills in for one of the other ships when it needs maintenance or training time.

This report focuses on the forces required to win two major wars as the baseline force-sizing metric. The military’s effectiveness as a deterrent against opportunistic competitor states, and a valued training partner in the eyes of other countries, derives from its effectiveness (proven or presumed) in winning wars.

Our Approach

With this in mind, we assessed the state of military affairs for U.S. forces as it pertains to their ability to deliver hard power against an enemy in three areas:

  • Capability,
  • Capacity, and
  • Readiness.

Capability. Examining the capability of a military force requires consideration of:

  • The proper tools (material and conceptual) of sufficient design, performance characteristics, technological advancement, and suitability for it to perform its function against an enemy force successfully.
  • The sufficiency of armored vehicles, ships, airplanes, and other equipment and weapons to win against the enemy.
  • The appropriate variety of options to preclude strategic vulnerabilities in the force and give flexibilities to battlefield commanders.
  • The degree to which elements of the force reinforce each other in covering potential vulnerabilities, maximizing strengths, and gaining greater effectiveness through synergies that are not possible in narrowly stovepiped, linear approaches to war.

The capability of the U.S. Joint Force was on ample display in its decisive conventional war victory over Iraq in liberating Kuwait in 1991 and later in the conventional military operation to liberate Iraq in 2003. Aspects of its capability have also been seen in numerous other operations undertaken since the end of the Cold War. While the conventional combat aspect at the “pointy end of the spear” of power projection has been more moderate in places like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Bosnia and Serbia, and Kosovo, and even against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, the fact that the U.S. military was able to conduct highly complex operations thousands of miles away in austere, hostile environments and sustain those operations as long as required is testament to the ability of U.S. forces to do things that few if any other countries can do.

A modern-day “major combat operation”9 along the lines of those upon which Pentagon planners base their requirements would feature a major opponent possessing modern integrated air defenses; naval power (surface and subsurface); advanced combat aircraft (to include bombers); a substantial inventory of short-range, medium-range, and long-range missiles; current-generation ground forces (tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, rockets, and anti-armor weaponry); cruise missiles; and (in some cases) nuclear weapons. Such a situation involving an actor capable of threatening vital national interests would present a challenge that is comprehensively different from the challenges that the U.S. Joint Force has faced in past decades.

In fact, 2015 saw a shift in debate within military circles about the extent to which the U.S. military is ready for major conventional warfare, given its focus on counterinsurgency, stability, and advise-and-assist operations over the past decade. The Army in particular has noted the need to reengage in training and exercises that feature larger-scale combined arms maneuver operations, especially to ensure that its higher headquarters elements are up to the task.

This Index ascertains the relevance and health of military service capabilities by looking at such factors as average age of equipment, generation of equipment relative to the current state of competitor efforts as reported by the services, and the status of replacement programs meant to introduce more updated systems as older equipment reaches the end of its programmed service life. While some of the information is quite quantitative, other factors could be considered judgment calls made by acknowledged experts in the relevant areas of interest or as addressed by senior service officials when providing testimony to Congress or addressing specific areas in other official statements.

It must be determined whether the services possess capabilities that are relevant to the modern combat environment.

Capacity. The U.S. military must have a sufficient quantity of the right capability or capabilities. There is a troubling but fairly consistent trend that characterizes the path from requirement to fielded capability within U.S. military acquisition. Along the way to acquiring the capability, several linked things happen that result in far less of a presumed “critical capability” than supposedly was required.

  • The manufacturing sector attempts to satisfy the requirements articulated by the military.
  • “Unexpected” technological hurdles arise that take longer and much more money to solve than anyone envisioned.
  • Programs are lengthened, and cost overruns are addressed (usually with more money).
  • Then the realization sets in that the country either cannot afford or is unwilling to pay the cost of acquiring the total number of platforms originally advocated. The acquisition goal is adjusted downward (if not canceled), and the military finally fields fewer platforms (at higher unit cost) than it originally said it needed to be successful in combat.

As deliberations proceed toward a decision on whether to reduce planned procurement, they rarely focus on and quantify the increase in risk that accompanies the decrease in procurement.

Something similar happens with force structure size: the number of units and total number of personnel the services say they need to meet the objectives established by the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense in their strategic guidance. The Marine Corps has stated that it needs 27 infantry battalions to fully satisfy the validated requirements of the regional Combatant Commanders, yet current funding for defense has the Corps at 23 on a path to 21. The Army was on a build toward 48 brigade combat teams, but funding reductions now have it at 35 on its way to 24 BCTs by 2019—half the number that the Army originally thought necessary—if sequestration remains law.

Older equipment can be updated with new components to keep it relevant, and commanders can employ fewer units more expertly for longer periods of time in an operational theater to accomplish an objective. At some point, however, sheer numbers of updated, modern equipment and trained, fully manned units are likely necessary to win in battle against a credible opponent when the crisis is profound enough to threaten a vital interest.

Capacity (numbers) can be viewed in at least three ways: compared to a stated objective for each category by each service, compared to amounts required to complete various types of operations across a wide range of potential missions as measured against a potential adversary, and as measured against a set benchmark for total national capability. This Index employs as a benchmark the two-MRC metric.

The two-MRC benchmark for force sizing is the minimum standard for U.S. hard-power capacity because one will never be able to employ 100 percent of the force at the same time. Some percentage of the force will always be unavailable because of long-term maintenance overhaul (for Navy ships in particular); unit training cycles; employment in myriad engagement and small-crisis response tasks that continue even during major conflicts; and the need to keep some portion of the force uncommitted to serve as a strategic reserve.

The historical record shows that the U.S. Army commits 21 BCTs on average to a major conflict; thus, a two-MRC standard would require 42 BCTs available for actual use. But an Army built to field only 42 BCTs would also be an Army that could find itself entirely committed to war, leaving nothing back as a strategic reserve, to replace combat losses, or to handle other U.S. security interests. Again, this Index assesses only the Active component of the services, though with full awareness that the Army also has Reserve and National Guard components that together account for half of the total Army. The additional capacity needed to meet these “above two-MRC requirements” could be handled by these other components or mobilized to supplement Active-component commitments. In fact, this is how the Army thinks about meeting operational demands and is at the heart of the current debate within the total Army about the roles and contributions of the various Army components. A similar situation exists with the Air Force and Marine Corps.10

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The balance among Active, Reserve, and Guard elements is beyond the scope of this study. Our focus here is on establishing a minimum benchmark for the capacity needed to handle a two-MRC requirement.

We conducted a review of the major defense studies (1993 BUR, QDR reports, and independent panel critiques) that are publicly available,11 as well as modern historical instances of major wars (Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom), to see whether there was any consistent trend in U.S. force allocation. The results of our review are presented in Table 6. To this we added 20 percent, both to account for forces and platforms likely to be unavailable and to provide a strategic reserve to guard against unforeseen demands. Summarizing the totals, this Index concluded that a two-MRC capable Joint Force would consist of:

  • Army: 50 BCTs.
  • Navy: 346 ships, 624 strike aircraft.
  • Air Force: 1,200 fighter/attack aircraft.
  • Marine Corps: 36 battalions.

America’s security interests require the services to have the capacity to handle two major regional conflicts successfully.

Readiness. The consequences of the current sharp reductions in funding mandated by sequestration have caused military service officials, senior DOD officials, and even Members of Congress to warn of the dangers of recreating the “hollow force” of the 1970s when units existed on paper but were staffed at reduced levels, minimally trained, and woefully equipped. To avoid this, the services have traded quantity/capacity and modernization to ensure that what they do have is “ready” for employment.

As was the case in 2014, the service chiefs have stated that current and projected levels of funding continue to take a toll on the ability of units to maintain sufficient levels of readiness across the force. Some units have reduced manning. Though progress has been made in some areas due to supplemental funding provided by Congress in 2014, the return of full sequestration threatens to undo these gains. For example:

  • General Raymond T. Odierno, former Chief of Staff of the Army, has stated that the Army can maintain only one-third of its force at acceptable levels of readiness. Each shuttering of a BCT incurs a lengthy restart cost. Specifically, “it takes approximately 30 months to generate a fully manned and trained Regular Army BCT,” and “senior command and control headquarters…take even longer.”12
  • General Mark A. Welsh, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, has noted that if the Air Force shut off all utilities at all major installations for 12 years or quit flying for nearly two years, it would save $12 billion—enough to buy back just one year of sequestered funds.13
  • The Navy is accepting risk in its ability to meet defense strategy requirements according to Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations. He has testified that under current spending limitations, “ships will arrive late to a combat zone, engage in conflict without the benefit of markedly superior combat systems, sensors and networks, or desired levels of munitions inventories.”14
    Also, the Navy can now surge only one-third of the force required by Combatant Commanders to meet contingency requirements.15

It is one thing to have the right capabilities to defeat the enemy in battle. It is another thing to have a sufficient amount of those capabilities to sustain operations over time and many battles against an enemy, especially when attrition or dispersed operations are significant factors. But sufficient numbers of the right capabilities are rather meaningless if the force is unready to engage in the task.

Scoring. In our final assessments, we tried very hard not to convey a higher level of precision than we think is achievable using unclassified, open-source, publicly available documents; not to reach conclusions that could be viewed as based solely on assertions or opinion; and not to rely solely on data and information that can be highly quantified, since simple numbers do not tell the whole story.

We believe the logic underlying our methodology is sound. This Index drew from a wealth of public testimony from senior government officials, from the work of recognized experts in the defense and national security analytic community, and from historical instances of conflict that seemed most appropriate to this project. This Index considered several questions, including:

  • How does one place a value on the combat effectiveness of such concepts as Air-Sea Battle, Network-centric Operations, Global Strike, or Joint Operational Access?
  • Is it entirely possible to assess accurately (1) how well a small number of newest-generation ships or aircraft will fare against a much larger number of currently modern counterparts when (2) U.S. forces are operating thousands of miles from home, (3) orchestrated with a particular operational concept, and (4) the enemy is leveraging a “home field advantage” that includes strategic depth and much shorter and perhaps better protected lines of communication and (5) might be pursuing much dearer national objectives than the U.S. such that the political will to conduct sustained operations in the face of mounting losses might differ dramatically?
  • How does one neatly quantify the element of combat experience, the health of a supporting workforce, the value of “presence and engagement operations,” and the related force structures and deployment/employment patterns that presumably deter war or mitigate its effects if it does occur?

This Index focused on the primary purpose of military power—to defeat an enemy in combat—and the historical record of major U.S. engagements for evidence of what the U.S. defense establishment has thought was necessary to execute a major conventional war successfully. To this we added the two-MRC benchmark, on-the-record assessments of what the services themselves are saying about their status relative to validated requirements, and the analysis and opinions of various experts in and out of government who have covered these issues for many years.

Taking it all together, we rejected scales that would imply extraordinary precision and settled on a scale that conveys broader characterizations of status that range from very weak to very strong. Ultimately, any such assessment is a judgment call informed by quantifiable data, qualitative assessments, thoughtful deliberation, and experience. We trust that our approach makes sense, is defensible, and is repeatable.

MS-2016-SCORE-TABLE-us-military-power 1000

Obama may Shut Down Government over UN Green Climate Fund


Craig Rucker | Cfact

President Obama may be prepared to shut down the entire U.S. government unless the Congress appropriates funds for the UN’s “Green Climate Fund.”

The fund was established as a mechanism for the transfer of funds from prosperous nations to “developing” nations. Despite many pledges, it has yet to receive large-scale funding. The managers of the fund recently reported that they have $5.83 billion on hand rather than the $10 billion which had been pledged.

The most current draft of the UN climate pact calls for the fund to receive $100 billion per year by 2020, and for it to be “scaled up” from there. This would be great news for carbon profiteers. We expect a substantial portion would “fall off the table” which would be great news as well for corrupt dictators and their tax-haven bankers.

Paul Bodnar is the National Security Council’s “senior energy and climate change director.” He told the press during a telephone briefing that transferring an inititial payment of $3 billlion to the UN fund is a “priority” for President Obama. He would not rule out a veto of the entire U.S. Budget if the President does not get it.

Not long ago President Obama called the possibility of a government shutdown over funding for Planned Parenthood “ridiculous.” Will it also be ridiculous if the President shuts down the government over the UN’s Green Climate Fund?

The UN’s most significant climate summit in years convenes in Paris on Monday with the aim of obtaining an international climate agreement to replace the Kyoto Prototocol.

The U.S. is not a signatory to Kyoto. The UN wants to bring the U.S. into a new climate pact now, before President Obama leaves office.

There are significant divides, particularly between “developed” and developing nations. “Climate finance” is a major one.

A few year’s back CFACT’s delegation to a UN summit in Bonn met with the representative of the island nation of Tonga. “Ah, you are Americans!” He said, “When are you going to send us the money?”

That sums up the attitude of the representatives of many developing nations. They see no reason to agree to anything in Paris unless they receive a major payout. They want U.S. taxpayers to foot a major portion of the bill.

That’s where they run into a little problem called the U.S. Constitution.

Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry hope to convince the UN summit to adopt a non-binding agreement rather than a binding treaty. They are well aware that they are unable to muster the two thirds majority of the Senate it would take to ratify a treaty. If funding the UN’s Green Climate Fund remains optional, U.S. funding remains contingent on a congressional appropriation.

Secretary Kerry said that the Administration is “struggling to find $3 billion for the green climate fund” at a speech at Old Dominion University. He recently seemed to leave open the possibility that the Administration would divert funds from other line items to the UN fund. This would run contrary to the principle that all U.S. spending must originate in the House of Representatives. Current House spending bills contain no appropriation for the fund and 37 Senators and 110 members of the House signed letters opposing contributions to the fund.

In addition, if climate funding is not made part of a binding treaty, future U.S. Administrations will be free to cut off the funds at any time.

UN climate Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres told the NY Times that finance is “the most challenging aspect of the whole deal… There is no credible road map to the $100 billion.”

Wealthier nations would like the flexibility to raise climate funds from a variety of sources including private business.  The developing nations are adamant that funding should come exclusively from government funds.

President Obama is flying to Paris Sunday hoping that in three days he can convince other nations to give him a climate agreement he can sign without Senate ratification. Other heads of state and UN delegates need to know that Obama’s legal basis for bypassing the Senate and going it alone on climate is dubious, and that there is insufficient support for ongoing funding of the UN’s Green Climate Fund in Congress.

Representatives of nations wondering, like Tonga, when the U.S. is “going to send us the money?” had best brace themselves for a financial disappointment.

Is EPA Fudging the Numbers for its Carbon Regulation?


IER | Institute for Energy Research

Most modelers calibrate their base cases to the Energy Information Administration (EIA)’s most recent Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) when conducting analyses of energy issues. In fact, since EIA is the premier energy information source for the federal government, it would make sense that agencies turn to their expertise and numbers when calculating those measures which might involve energy. However, the EPA stands out because its regulatory agenda has enormous impacts on energy cost and availability, but it frequently chooses not to use EIA’s numbers.

For instance, the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2015 reports 263 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity in its base case in 2020.[i] However, EPA just 4 months later, reports a base case where the United States will have just 208 gigawatts of coal-fired generating capacity in 2020.[ii] Starting with 55 less gigawatts of coal-fired generating capacity makes it appear much easier to comply with EPA’s regulation of carbon dioxide from power plants—what EPA calls its “Clean Power Plan.” EPA’s modeling makes it appear that fewer coal-fired retirements will be caused by its regulation and less new capacity must be built to replace the shuttered coal-fired generating units.

Creating its own energy modeling separate from that of EIA results in EPA regulations that appear more economically feasible than they otherwise would. But it is ironic that EPA complains about a lack of funding while simultaneously spending EPA resources to duplicate the modeling EIA does.

Comparison of Generating Capacity in EIA and EPA Base Cases

The table below compares the electricity generating capacity in the base cases for EPA and EIA by technology type for 2020. EPA reports 63 gigawatts less total capacity in 2020 than does EIA. Most of the capacity difference is in coal-fired generating capacity where EPA reports that only 208 gigawatts of coal capacity will be available in 2020 while EIA reports a total of 263 gigawatts—a difference of 55 gigawatts. Apparently, EPA assumes that these 55 gigawatts of generating capacity were shuttered due to other regulations that it has promulgated because as utility owners see new regulations that makes a previous regulation uneconomic, it will shutter the plant rather than modify it.

The loss of 55 gigawatts of coal-fired generating capacity from the electric fleet in EPA’s analysis means that it appears there will be less coal-fired capacity that will need to be shuttered due to the so-called “Clean Power Plan” making it less expensive in EPA’s analysis to comply with the rule. For perspective, 55 gigawatts is more capacity than the total installed coal capacity of any country expect China, the United States, and India.[iii] To further put it in perspective, Germany has about 51 gigawatts of total generating capacity meaning that EPA’s modeling assumes that enough capacity to power one of the largest economies in the world disappears by 2020.


EPA Base Cases Differ Between Proposed and Final Analysis of Clean Power Plan

In June 2014, EPA published its analysis of the proposed Clean Power Plan.[iv] In that analysis, the agency reported a total of 1,005 gigawatts of generating capacity in the United States in 2020 in its base case, but changed that projection to 1,016 gigawatts in its August 2015 analysis. But the striking change was in coal-fired generating capacity where 36 gigawatts was assumed to be shuttered, being replaced by mostly renewable capacity—5 gigawatts of hydroelectric and 37 gigawatts of non-hydroelectric renewables. While the 244 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity in 2020 in EPA’s base case of its analysis of the proposed rule is still 19 gigawatts less than in EIA’s AEO 2015 base case, it was a lot closer than the 208 gigawatts of coal-fired capacity in its base case of the final rule.


EPA Analytical Results Are Radically Different from Other Analyses

In EPA’s analysis of the Clean Power Plan, the agency claims that average U.S. electricity prices in 2030 would be just 0.8 percent or 0.01 percent higher than in its reference case, depending on the case considered. Out of the 22 regions the agency models, 6 or 7 regions, depending on the case, were expected to have decreased electricity prices in 2030 compared to its base case, while 15 or 16 regions, depending on the case, were expected to have increased prices. No region was expected to see a price increase of more than 6.3 percent. One region could see a price decrease of as much as 10.1 percent. Clearly the few regions with decreased prices overwhelmed those with increased prices to make the national average increase so small.[v]

According to a study by NERA Economic Consulting, EPA’s so-called “Clean Power Plan” will hike electricity prices in all 47 states that are subject to the regulation. Of those 47 states, 40 states would see average electricity prices rise by 10 percent or more and 27 states would see average electricity prices increase 20 percent or more.[vi] Further, losses to consumers would range between $64 billion and $79 billion on a present value basis between 2022 and 2033. Energy sector expenditure increases would average between $29 and $39 billion per year. Energy expenditures in this analysis include changes in electricity generation costs, energy efficiency costs, and natural gas costs to non-electric consumers, but does not include increased costs for transmission and distribution and natural gas infrastructure.

Energy Ventures Analysis’ study of the EPA’s “Clean Power Plan” finds: 1) consumers will pay an additional $214 billion by 2030; 2) 45 states will see double digit increases in wholesale electricity costs; 3) 16 states will see a 25 percent or higher increase in wholesale electricity costs; and 4) 41,000 megawatts of perfectly good electric generating capacity will be forced to prematurely retire, costing the nation $64 billion to needlessly replace.[vii]


It is not surprising that EPA’s analysis of its regulation of carbon dioxide from power plants would differ from other analyses that calibrate to EIA’s report because EPA makes the heroic assumption that enough generating capacity to power Germany disappears without this regulation.

When EPA promulgates rule after rule against the electric generating sector, it is not unexpected that electric generating owners will shutter a plant early rather than make modifications to comply with ever increasing amounts of red tape. What is disingenuous, however, is that EPA magically changes its base case coal-fired generating numbers to make compliance less expensive as it did between its analysis of its proposed vs. final rule. While other modelers calibrate to EIA’s base case, EPA clearly does not. So, it looks like the agency is “fudging the numbers” in order to get a desired result. 

[i] Energy information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2015, Table A9, Electric Generating Capacity, April 14, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/tbla9.pdf

[ii] Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, Table 3-12, August 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf

[iii] International Energy Agency, Analysis of Globally Installed Coal-fired Power Plant Fleet, 2012, https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CCS_Retrofit.pdf

[iv] Environmental Protection Administration, Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule – Regulatory Impact Analysis, June 2, 2014, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602ria-clean-power-plan.pdf

[v] Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, Table 3-21, August 2015, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf

[vi] NERA Economic Consulting, Energy and Economic Impacts Of EPA’s Clean Power Plan, November 7, 2015, http://www.americaspower.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NERA-CPP-Final-Nov-7.pdf

[vii] Energy Ventures Analysis, EPA’s Clean Power Plan An Economic Impact Analysis, November 2015, http://nma.org/attachments/article/2368/11.13.15%20NMA_EPAs%20Clean


Denying the Obvious – Actions Speak Louder Than Words!

 1 Kings 18:21

‘It’s easier to fool people than to convince them that they have been fooled.’ –Mark Twain

While the presidential race is well under way and all of the candidates are promising what they will do when, and if, they become the President of the United States, not one of them has stated that they will right all of the wrongs concerning the past and present administrations.

Yet, if you look and listen closely (Jeremiah 5:21-23) to what these candidates say and contrast what they do, you will see that things just do not line up. Instead, they simply stand in direct contradiction (Matthew 23:3).

There is not one of the candidates, not one, who has drawn up Articles of Impeachment (Article 2, Sections 4 of The United States Constitution; Jeremiah 5:1). Nor have any of them stated they would seek to prosecute the current occupant of the White House for his treason and crimes. Not one! Yet, they would have you believe that they are going to right the wrongs when they become the president, but not in their current position?

They have the opportunity even now to do so, but every single representative in this country up to this point has failed to do so! They are derelict of duty and that before God and man (1 John 5:2).

It is absolutely astounding to me that if the average American were to stand in front of an apple tree and were then told by these politicians (diplomatic magicians) that it were an orange tree, they would be sure to fall in line and agree with them. This is exactly what is happening when we listen to their words, but their actions reflect the actual fruit seen hanging on their tree.

“For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. For every tree is known by his own fruit. For of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes.”-Luke 6:43

The corrupt tree is directly in front of the American people’s faces (James 2:14-26).

“They that observe lying vanities forsake their own mercy.” -Jonah 2:8

This is coming from the country that should know better. The American people, as well as their representatives, refuse to call the obvious for what it is. Then they fail to understand why this country is in the condition that it is. The reason is that if they do not stand against it, it is because they are guilty of it.

If you are looking for a politician to be the savior of America, you are looking in the wrong direction. How is it that America forsakes its own mercies? Instead of going to the Word of God (“No King but King Jesus”), which commands judgment in the act of lawlessness (Leviticus 26:15), Americans look to their favorite politician to stand up and fight for what they are unwilling to fight for, even when they know that the politician is corrupt. And over and over again Americans gain a slow digression into the next level of debased immorality.

It has been rightly stated that “today’s conservatives are simply yesterday’s liberals” (Jeremiah 17:5). America, Think! (Exodus 20) I have heard in the past by a presidential hopeful that if Ronald Reagan were in a room and Jesus Christ in another room that they would all flock to Ronald Reagan (1 Kings 18:21).

It is time for Americans to tear down the sacred cow of “Let them do it for us.” In case people have forgotten what it means to be a patriot, remember what the things we were reminded of by our past presidents.

“Patriotism means to stand by the country. It does not mean to stand by the president or any other public official, save exactly to the degree in which he himself stands by the country. It is patriotic to support him insofar as he efficiently serves the country. It is unpatriotic not to oppose him to the exact extent that by inefficiency or otherwise he fails in his duty to stand by the country. In either event, it is unpatriotic not to tell the truth, whether about the president or anyone else.” -President Theodore Roosevelt

The Bible is the ROCK upon which our Republic rests. -President Andrew Jackson

“There is nothing stable but Heaven and the Constitution. –President James Buchanan

When it comes to the things that have been going on in this country since the 1960s, it really is not that complicated. Americans have not been fooled, they have denied the obvious through their inaction (passing it on for someone else to do). They have wickedly departed from their God (2 Samuel 22:22) and have willfully neglected everything that has been right there in front of their faces, good or bad. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep His commandments: For this is the whole duty of man (Ecclesiastes 12:13-14).

10 Things to Know about the UN Partition Vote of November 29, 1947

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution1 which adopted the plan for the partition of Palestine recommended by the majority of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). 33 states voted in favor of the resolution and 13 voted against. 10 states abstained.

UN General Assembly vote on partition

  1. It was a historic resolution that expressed the then-prevailing view of most of the major states of the United Nations, which voted in favor of it.
  2. It established the principle of two states for two peoples.
  3. It recognized the uniqueness of Jerusalem and the Jewish people’s bond to the city.
  4. Had the Arabs agreed to live with the resolution as the Israelis did, despite its drawbacks from the standpoint of both sides, we would be in a different situation today with far fewer bereaved families on both sides.
  5. Because of the Arabs’ rejection of it and in light of their decision to fight its implementation, the resolution has not assumed any validity except for the historical symbolism of its basic content.

Hadassah hospital convoy

  1. The significance of its nonimplementation is that all the previously existing historical and legal rights as recognized by the Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate, and the San Remo Resolution have remained in force.
  2. From that time to the present, negotiation mechanisms prescribed by Resolution 242 (1967), the Camp David accords (1979), and the Oslo agreements (1993-1999) have not been completed and no solution has been agreed upon.
  3. Therefore, all the claims about Israel’s rights (and also, of course, about the Arabs’ rights) are still valid and remain unchanged until agreement on a permanent settlement is reached.
  4. Therefore, any assertion by the United Nations and the Europeans about the territory belonging to the Palestinians in fact contravenes the symbolic basis of the partition resolution.
  5. The time has come for the states to recognize this and stop contravening that symbolic basis.

* * *


1 http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20general%20assembly%20resolution%20181.aspx

Source: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

UN says Maurice Strong is gone—we just don’t know where or when


Judi McLeod | Canada Free Press

The ghost of Maurice Strong will haunt the UN’s COP21, where the ultimate lottery win for UN bureaucrats is being pushed.  A desperate lib-left, determined to force on a public—97% of which doesn’t believe that global warming trumps Islamic terrorism as the world’s biggest threat—will see to it.

Incredibly, the man who hurled the biggest rock at humanity’s progress;  the one who forbad refrigeration and air conditioning for the masses, passed through this life in the same manner as his final obit: unchronicled, undocumented, unnoticed.

There is no obit for Maurice Strong anywhere on major Internet news sites other than the one on Canada’s CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), and the Huffington Post; no mention of Strong’s death on   Drudge or Fox News at time of this writing.  As Huff Po states: “There were no immediate details about where and when Strong died”.

Nor will there be until COP21 ‘decarbonizes’ the world by the time it wraps up on December 12.

Strong’s the God Father of the Environment;  the creator of sustainability, yet the news of his death came from the UN by Twitter yesterday.

“Strong will forever be remembered for placing the environment on the international agenda and at the heart of development,” Achim Steiner, executive director of the UN Environment Program,  (UNEP) tweeted.

The Twitter did not provide details of Strong’s death, which until COP 21 is over, is the equivalent of a UN state secret in a moment in time where Strong’s ghost is more useful than his physical presence.

Is it a conspiracy theory thinking that it’s possible that Strong’s death and obit are being kept on ice for exploitation by COP21 boosterism which gets underway beginning tomorrow?

Without knowing—or at least not admitting he is in possession of the where and when of Strong’s death—Canada’s newly-elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made a public statement on the same day as the UN death notice by Twitter:

“Mr. Strong was an internationally recognized environmentalist and philanthropist who used his remarkable business acumen, organizational skills and humanity to make the world a better place,” said Trudeau in a statement.

Maurice Strong ghosts in the Trudeau dynasty were very much alive circa 1970s:  “In 1976 Mr. Trudeau’s father, then prime minister Pierre Trudeau, made Strong the first head of the national oil company Petro-Canada.” (CBC)

In his ‘surprise’ Saturday Twitter, Steiner said “Strong’s work helped usher in a new era of international environmental diplomacy at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, which saw the birth of UNEP, the first UN agency to be headquartered in a developing country.” (CBC)

Those not taken off guard throughout Strong’s long UN career knew this next statement would not be long in coming:

“The sustainability roadmap which started in Stockholm, continued in Rio, Johannesburg and Rio+20, must now become a reality in Paris,” Steiner said. “This would indeed be the most fitting tribute to the legacy of Maurice Strong; leader, mentor and friend.”

The lib-left already has Maurice Strong, who died at age 86, winging his way to Environmental Heaven with wings white as the driven snow.

As UN Poster Boy, Strong made millions on claims that CO2 was most responsible for man-made global warming, and his contemporaries   like Al Gore are still making millions on those outrageous claims.

As his spirit ventures out into the Great Unknown, he was never called to any kind of earthly justice for co-authoring,  with former Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, a re-written set of Golden Rules, called the Earth Charter,  replacing the original ones handed down by the Creator to Moses.

To this day, the hideous and hypocritical Earth Charter is still dragged about as a sort of global warming Dog and Pony show in a a faux , gilded ‘Ark of Hope’ chest—- as a supposed replica of the Ark of the Covenant.

You can’t make this stuff up—unless that is you are a sworn member of the global warming alarmist crowd.

Watch out, world because the saintly Strong already has an earthly replacement in global wealth redistributor Joe Stiglitz. who will be headlining at the UNIDO General Conference next week. Stiglitz will denouce republicans, conservatives and will shame them,  thus helping Obama to pay the outstanding dues and return to UNIDO. (unido.org)

Stiglitz will denounce David Cameron as he is an advisor to Jeremy Corbin. Also Australia, Canada and New Zealand can count on being called out for betraying prosperity and economic empowerment by leaving UNIDO.

Meanwhile, Maurice Strong may have left Mother Earth but his ghost has taken up permanent residence at the UN.


Judi McLeod — Bio and Archives

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Judi McLeod is an award-winning journalist with 30 years’ experience in the print media. A former Toronto Sun columnist, she also worked for the Kingston Whig Standard. Her work has appeared on Rush Limbaugh, Newsmax.com, Drudge Report, Foxnews.com, and Glenn Beck.

Judi can be emailed at: judi@canadafreepress.com

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