INSS Insight No. 173
The announcement that China was joining the new round of talks over sanctions against Iran was received initially as welcome news, although this does not necessarily indicate a change in Chinese policy or suggest that the international struggle against Iran will now gather renewed momentum. Nevertheless, it is important to examine what is motivating China to join the talks and the possible ramifications of this move.
China's decision to support an additional round of sanctions does not represent a precedent, as China was a partner to three such previous decisions. Similarly, one may assume that its previous interests on the issue remain intact. Economically, Iran is one of the five large oil exporters to China; Beijing has signed contracts with Iran for investments in oil worth billions of dollars and maintains extensive trade relations with Iran. While China has recently reduced its oil imports from Iran, it also estimates that should significant sanctions be brought to bear on Iran's economy China would be the worst-affected nation in the world. Strategically and politically, it seems that the Iranian regime continues to play an important role for China. In Beijing's assessment, since the end of the Cold War the United States has been expanding its hold on the Middle East and taking over its sources of oil. This situation, in tandem with America's control of the naval routes, makes China a hostage to America. Given these circumstances, the survival of Iran's regime serves a double purpose for China, both as an important oil producer free of American influence and as a possible land buffer (contiguous with Pakistan) between China and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it is important to China to prevent an Iranian collapse. A further motive for China's desire to maintain its ties with the Iranian regime is Iran's status as an exporter of terrorism. China views terrorism and the rising tide of radical Islam as significant threats and sees its ties to Iran as a means of keeps these threats at bay. More broadly, Beijing sees the international struggle against Iran as a case study representing America's attempts to forces its values on its rivals, including China, and further entrench its hegemony. Obstructing America's interference with Iran is thus seen by China as an important objective.
In that case, why did China decide to join the sanctions talks? As in previous rounds, this time too the decision is linked to China's relations with the United States. Alongside longstanding competition, Sino-American relations include a great deal of cooperation, and Beijing estimates its dependence on the United States to be quite high. This relates not only to trade relations and investments, but also to the political and strategic stability provided by the United States internationally; China's economic development depends on this stability. Since the Obama administration took office, relations between the two nations have deteriorated and serious disputes between them have arisen, including the issue of the Chinese currency's exchange rate and reduction of the American trade deficit, the American weapons deal with Taiwan (which has yet to go into effect), and Google's ceasing its activities in China. These disputes all touch on fundamental Chinese interests, and unless the disputes are resolved, China will likely pay a considerable price. Indeed, China has been working lately to ease the tensions, and one may assume that its agreeing to join the sanctions talks is connected to this effort.
Another possible reason for China's joining the talks is the concern that the Western powers will abandon the path of collective sanctions and prefer to impose harsh unilateral ones. This would pose a dilemma for China: stay out of the circle of sanctions or join it? The first option is liable to hurt its economic and diplomatic ties with the West, whereas the second would severely damage its relations with Iran and its image in the eyes of the developing nations. Compared to this dilemma, joining the talks does not loom as a terrible scenario. It does not extend beyond the line China has taken so far, it gives China a certain amount of control over its moves, and it buys China more time.
In addition, it is safe to assume that China's decision was also motivated by other reasons, at least two of which have received public attention: the commitment by Saudi Arabia, via the United States, to supply China's oil needs should the supply from Iran be impeded, and the transmission of new information to China by a senior Israeli delegation visiting China in February regarding the progress of the nuclear program and the negative ramifications of a nuclear Iran on the global economy. These reasons, particularly the Saudi proposal, no doubt played a part in China's decision, but may not have been the primary motive. In addition, it is hard to imagine that the Chinese changed their mind on their fundamental stance towards Iran. As far as anyone knows, the Saudi proposal has been on the table for over a year, yet this failed to move Beijing to join the sanctions talks. Therefore, some other factor propelled China toward the negotiations table. As for the information transmitted by Israel, even if it did change China's assessment of Iran's nuclear program, one may assume that long ago China took into consideration the possibility of Iran obtaining military nuclear capabilities (whether by actually possessing nuclear bombs or by becoming a threshold state), and that was not viewed as a threat of the highest order. While Beijing declares its opposition to a nuclear Iran and does in fact view such a development negatively, it views no less negatively the possibility that the stability of the Iranian regime might suffer as the result of pressures from the international community. At the same time, one should not underestimate the importance of the messages transmitted by Israel because Israel's possible moves on the Iranian issue are considered by China with a great deal of seriousness.
What are the ramifications of China joining the sanctions talks? Since Beijing's basic positions on the issue have not changed, China's joining the talks is liable to extend their duration and weaken their effectiveness. In general, China is expected to oppose sanctions that might undermine the regime's stability - including limitations on Iran's energy, financial, and trade sectors - and thereby dull the pain of the proposed round of sanctions. This would present the powers in the West with a challenge, as they will not want to forfeit China's participation and may prefer compromise decisions that include China over more effective decisions reached without China. In the meantime, dragging out the talks will give Iran a critical time extension. The declarations China made public around the time of the announcement that it was joining the talks, whereby it still opposes taking forcible measures, already hint at difficulties to come.
The conclusion one is forced to reach, then, is that unless there is a significant change in China's understanding of its interests vis-à-vis Iran, its participation in sanctions talks will not advance the cause of the international community and might even set it back. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask what moves may change China's basic position regarding the Iranian program and move China to take effective action to halt it. The answer lies in China's basic interests: stability in the Middle East as well as in the global energy market, and a halt to America's growing military hold on the Persian Gulf. Should China be persuaded that the continuation of Iran's nuclear project threatens these interests, it may well be possible to impel China to act.
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.
