INSS Insight No. 150
When President Obama met with the president of China in Beijing last month, he cautioned that he would not be able to block an Israeli attack against Iran much longer unless there is progress in the attempts to stop Iran's nuclear program. This warning was intended to persuade China of the urgent need for additional sanctions against Iran. Yet even if the potential success of this warning is questionable, it raises questions about Chinese interests in Iran and the Middle East as a whole, about Israel's place vis-à-vis these interests, and about Jerusalem's possible influence over Beijing.
Until recently, it was commonplace to assume that Chinese interests in the Middle East, including Iran, lay in guaranteeing its energy supply. The tremendous growth of the Chinese economy has created an ever-growing dependence on imported energy, and in 2008 China became the world's third largest importer.
Of all energy sources outside China, the Middle East plays a major role, as about half of China's imported oil comes from that region. In light of the expected growth in China's demand for oil and the anticipated diminishing supply from oil fields elsewhere in the world, the importance of the Middle East to China's energy market is expected to grow. This may explain China's interests in fostering relations with the major oil producers in the Middle East and its concern about any move liable to undermine the political and military stability of the region.
Nonetheless, this concern alone cannot explain China's insistence on defending Iran from tougher international steps, because China reportedly rejected the Saudi offer to supply all its oil needs at low cost as a substitute for Iranian oil should the need arise. Were oil alone the center of China's interests, it would not matter to China if the source were Iran or Saudi Arabia. Therefore, China must have other interests in Iran and the region.
Generally speaking, one may differentiate four separate issues. The first is China's drive to establish itself internationally as a power offering an alternative agenda to that of the United States. In this context, China is trying to acquire the support of the developing nations, many of which are under American pressure to change their internal and external conduct. China has opposed outside intervention in states' internal matters, and in this sense, a Chinese agreement to sanctions against Iran is tantamount to surrender to an American agenda and abandonment of potential allies.
Second, as part of its efforts to vary its energy sources, China is investing billions of dollars in developing oil infrastructures in various countries in exchange for guaranteed large future oil supplies. China made investments of this type in Iran, and is thus interested in maintaining good relations with the regime that signed these contracts.
Third, in light of forecasts that its dependence on Middle East oil will only grow, and in light of its desire to increase its political influence internationally, China understands that it will not be able to avoid increasing its involvement in the Middle East. Indeed, while China tended (and apparently still tends) to view the Middle East as "the graveyard of superpowers," it seems that in recent years it is both introducing variety into its regional relations and strengthening its ties with the Middle East: bolstering its diplomatic ties with various rulers, increasing its economic investments and commercial ties in the region, and showing signs of strengthened military ties with various nations, including Iran. Its growing involvement in the region may position it to stand at the head of an anti-American front in the not too distant future, and therefore is better off not being seen as buckling under American dictates.
This leads us to China's fourth interest in the region, namely weakening America's military presence. One of the concerns consistently expressed by the Chinese is the de facto American control of global oil sources and supply channels, which would allow the United States to block oil and gas exports to China should relations between the two powers hit a severe crisis. In this context, the establishment of the American military presence in the Middle East and Central Asia (the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan) is viewed by China as an explicit threat to its interests, and China desires to curb this to the extent possible. From this perspective, leaving Iran out of the American circle of influence and military presence serves China's interests well. Beyond this, should the day come when the United States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan - as China would like - China would be able to open up a direct land route to the Persian Gulf.
This complex of reasons goes a long way towards explaining China's opposition to American-instituted international sanctions against Iran. At the same time, a military attack on Iran would likely damage Chinese interests even more. Not only would an attack shock the global oil market, at least in the short term, but it would demonstrate to the nations of the region and the world at large China's impotence in determining international moves. It would also jeopardize China's investments in Iran and be liable to end with the United States posting its troops, one way or another, inside Iran.
In light of this, the Israeli stick President Obama was waving is indeed relevant, on condition that China becomes convinced that Israel is determined enough to undertake such a move and the United States would allow it to act. Various steps will likely be required to persuade China, a nation with many generations of experience with complex diplomatic maneuvers, that this is the case.
At any rate, whatever effect such a threat may have, the very fact that it is uttered requires China to take note of another point: Israel's place in its complex of interests. Aside from a brief period in the history of the two nations when it seemed that their military ties and Israel's moves in Washington gave Jerusalem some sort of influence over Beijing, China's attitude to Israel has always been determined by much broader international considerations. The reason apparently is that Israel does not have significant enough assets to interest China, in particular not of the kind that could tip the scales against the Muslim world's oil assets. Accordingly, it may be that President Obama served Israel well by pointing out the most effective way of reaching the heart of Beijing at the critical time China is working to increase its influence on the region. Thus instead of focusing on identifying joint assets and interests through which it may be possible to influence Chinese policy, Israel must put greater efforts into understanding the complex of China's interests and its conduct, and on the basis of this understanding identify both direct and indirect ways of exerting influence.
Dr. Yoram Evron is a lecturer in the Asian Studies Department at the University of Haifa and a research associate at INSS.
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel's national security and Middle East affairs. Through its mixture of researchers with backgrounds in academia, the military, government, and public policy, INSS is able to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of leading strategic issues and offer policy analysis and recommendations to decision makers and public leaders, policy analysts, and theoreticians, both in Israel and abroad. As part of its mission, it is committed to encourage new ways of thinking and expand the traditional contours of establishment analysis.
