INSS Insight No. 120
The reality of the Iranian nuclear issue and the possibility that as a result of America's new policy Russia will find itself outside the game have created a dilemma for Russia. So far Russia has assumed an ambivalent position: on the one hand it expresses concern over Iran's possibly becoming a nuclear power, denies any involvement in the process, and seemingly agrees that it is necessary to stop Iran, and on the other hand, expresses sweeping support for Iran, which includes active participation in the development of Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
Russia is apparently realizing that it must take a clear stand and choose between two options: participate in the effort to contain the Iranian program, which would improve its relations with the West but negatively affect its chances of using the crisis to promote its own agenda, or allow Iran to complete its nuclear program, which may yield Russia relative advantages vis-à-vis its international standing. Russia's considerations are affected both by external variables and by the lack of unanimity on the issue within Russia.
The background to understanding Russia's political conduct on the Iranian issue is the broader international level. Russia, which is motivated by superpower ambitions has been attempting for a decade to upgrade its international status, is pinning most of its hopes - alongside attempts to contain the threats to its national security - on changing the existing world order. Policies are accompanied by rhetoric to construct a multi-polar alternative to the current uni-polar US-led system that will afford it equal status and allow it to realize relative advantages.
In foreign policy, Russia balances its activity in the existing international system as a fitting partner to the West with parallel activity on the regional level, intending to reduce the influence of the United States and the West in the region, alongside active defiance on the international arena. On the regional level, Russia builds cooperation with leading powers usually of an anti-Western bent. This is fully evident in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general. Relations include cooperation and the ability to conduct simultaneous dialogue with all sides in the local conflicts, which grants Russia a clear relative advantage. However, its major support goes to its anti-Western partners.
Russia views Iran as a major player in the Middle East and Central Asia (especially the Caspian Sea region), which positions Iran as a power in an area central to Russia's geopolitical interests. The region's sensitivity is all the more evident, as it is also a focus of Western, Islamic, and even Chinese foreign interests. Iran - controversial in Russia too - receives special attention as a partner in curbing the West and as the potential future leader of the Islamic world.
Because of these considerations, the Russian leadership tends to believe that by embracing the Iranian side it will benefit more, even if at the expense of its relations with the West. Iran's imperialist ambition and its unpredictable conduct after it attains nuclear weapons, for example, do not seem to it to be enough of a threat to justify forfeiting the advantages inherent in changing the regional or perhaps even the global order. In addition, it is clear to Russia that if it concedes its standing in Iran, China will enter the scene in its stead. On the other hand, it is possible to detect Russian anxiety about a potential Iranian threat against future Russian interests: strong neighbors have always penetrated the field of Russia's geopolitical interests.
Economic competition in the Caspian Sea region, the threat of Islamic incitement against Russia, and the fear of Iran's exploiting a nuclear umbrella to expand the empire at Russia's expense are all reasons for concern. Likewise Iran's international conduct disturbs Russia to no small degree. Yet alongside these deterrent considerations, Russia is choosing to support Iran in political, economic, and security areas (even though arms exports to Iran are limited, controlled, and take regional sensitivities into account).
Russia is generally considered to be a leading contributor to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, especially regarding the construction of the reactor in Bushehr and the "flow" of knowledge and technologies from Russia to Iran in previous years. Russia for its part claims that its involvement entailed the building of a nuclear project solely for peaceful purposes. Russia also maintains that Iran has neither the intention nor the capability of realizing a military nuclear program. Lately, however, after a period of extended denials and in the face of explicit proof and increased international pressure, Russian rhetoric has changed. Now it claims that if indeed there was such an Iranian attempt, Russia certainly did not assist it, though others (China, North Korea, Pakistan, even the Europeans) may have. Russia continues to deny Iran's capability to complete the military project, certainly not in the short term.
Russia does not support pressure on Iran, opposes the sanctions option, and decidedly rejects any military involvement. On the contrary, Russia contends that renewed negotiations with Iran should be launched on an equal footing, using a different style, in order to attain effective international supervision. It is true, claims Russia, that nothing will stop the program now, but it is possible to slow it down greatly, an option that is far more effective than attacking Iran, which at most would achieve a limited setback.
It is clear to Russia that completing the nuclear program will turn Iran into a proven power with far reaching ambitions, because even if no immediate nuclear threat is involved, it is possible that Iran would move towards changing the geopolitical reality at its neighbors' - and perhaps Russia's - expense. However, Russia is of the opinion that nuclear weapons are precisely the element likely to contribute to stabilization, as was proven by the Cold War.
Russia is surrounded on all sides by nuclear powers, and another one will not change the overall balance. According to this logic, should Iran become a nuclear power, Russia may earn additional leverage, including a change in the regional order or perhaps even the global order, because in such a reality there will be room for arms control, verification mechanisms, and international security arrangements. In all these areas Russia will want to gain stature through effective dialogue with the involved parties and will strive for a position of leadership.
Because a nuclear process now seems irreversible, Russia is suggesting a constructive dialogue with Tehran that recognizes Iran's demands for appropriate international standing, in order to implement tools that limit future threats through a system of regulated verification and containment agreements. It warns of a potential attack on Iran and dire results in the wake of a severe Iranian response and subsequent international chaos. Russia's status and interests are liable to be damaged as the result of an attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. However, it is also possible to envision certain positive contingencies: the need to rebuild Iran and upgraded Russian involvement in the establishment of new regional arrangements.
Overall, it seems that Russia's conduct is meant to contain the international community's efforts to curb Iran's nuclear program. It is possible that Russia prefers the completion of Iran's nuclear program in order ultimately to gain benefits, namely, by positioning itself as the one that would bridge and oversee a new regional order, which assumes the weakening of the United States and Israel.
Thus in the current effort to contain the Iranian nuclear program, Russia faces a dilemma. Russia's motivation comprises superpower ambitions on the international arena, new political constraints, and internal Russian doubts. Russia views Iran as a potential leader of the Islamic world and as a future regional power. As such, Iran is a desirable regional partner and an asset for Russia's global interests. Moreover, Russia attributes a positive dimension to the Iranian nuclear program, even if it is viewed as a severe threat both on the regional and the international levels and might even threaten Russia's own future interests: the essential effect that the issue has on the regional and international orders give Russia some relative advantages as an active partner in the fashioning of international arrangements.
Whether it chooses to engage in efforts with the international community to curb Iran or to support the continuation of the Iranian program, Russia is positioned in a fairly comfortable situation and is preparing to reap the benefits of all worlds. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will support the Iranian nuclear program with intelligent neutralization of the international attempt at containment. However, such a decision is difficult to identify, dynamic, and reversible, depending on future circumstances.
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