Statements made by US President Obama and Vice President Biden in the first week of July regarding the US position on Iran elevated in particular the issue of whether a green light had been provided to Israel for an attack on Iran. The immediate question of a possible green light was raised by Biden when he said in an interview from Iraq that the US cannot dictate to another country what they can and cannot do when they determine that they are existentially threatened. The issue was then put to rest when Obama absolutely denied that this meant the US was giving Israel a green light to attack. According to Obama, Biden had merely stated a "categorical fact": that the US cannot dictate to other states what their security interests are.
The importance of the green light issue is not whether an Israeli attack is one step closer - in fact Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has signaled that he will go along with Obama's engagement approach until the end of the year - but rather what it means in terms of the broader message the US is trying to convey to Iran. There are indications that the Obama administration is attempting to fine-tune its strategy on Iran, and quietly put in place different levers for pressuring Iran if no diplomatic movement is in sight. When the "green light" remarks are assessed within the context of other high-level statements and developments over the past 10 days, this trend becomes even more apparent.
Obama's current dilemma is that while he has made it clear that he remains committed to negotiations, Iran has still not responded to the US offer. Moreover, Ahmadinejad has promised to take an even more determined stance against the West in response to their recent "meddling" in Iran's internal affairs, even though Obama took every possible precaution in order not to be perceived as interfering in this way.
So what to do when your hand remains outstretched and nobody takes it? How to introduce pressure without seeming to undermine a firm commitment to negotiations? The set of subtle and admittedly somewhat confusing messages that have recently been issued most likely reflect the Administration's attempt to do just that. And the surprising remarks on Israel are perhaps not as surprising when viewed in this context.
In the first set of statements - on the eve of Obama's trip to Russia - both the President and Biden clarified in separate interviews firm US intent to seek engagement and diplomacy with Iran, regardless of the post-election dynamics in that country. It is noteworthy that when Vice President Biden added his remarks on Israel, he was very clear about distancing the US from any Israeli decision to attack. And when President Obama related to Biden's statements the next day from Russia, he continued this line. He referred to US inability to dictate to others, but also his own clear decision to pursue engagement. So the idea that an attack could take place was planted, and then firm US commitment to engagement and diplomacy - even after the election and its brutal aftermath - was underscored. Pressure was given another subtle boost, however, when Obama clarified in the continuation of his remarks that, "as commander in chief", he reserves the right "to take whatever actions are necessary to protect the United States".
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen contributed to this dynamic on July 7th in a speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC upon his return from the summit in Russia, where he accompanied President Obama. Mullen stated that the US should conduct dialogue with Iran with all options on the table, including the military option. He stressed that the window for dialogue is a narrow one, and that the scenario of a nuclear Iran could spur a nuclear arms race that no one can afford. He again asserted that an attack on Iran would also be a destabilizing development, but expressed understanding of Israel's calculation of an existential threat. He noted that this was an important part of the overall equation which underscores why it is so important for diplomacy to succeed.
During his visit to Russia, Obama worked on putting additional levers of pressure in place: improving US-Russian relations, but not relenting on the issue of missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic - an issue which is still under review in the new US administration. Without creating outward tension, Obama successfully resisted Russia's attempt to link the missile defense question to Russia's willingness to proceed on renegotiating START. Moreover, he reiterated his own linkage between missile defense and the emerging Iranian nuclear threat. After months of relative quiet in this regard, Obama used this occasion to emphasize that if Iran was no longer a proliferation concern, there would be no need for missile defense. The initial agreement reached with Russia on the guidelines for continued arms control negotiations is thus an important message to Iran: improved US-Russian relations which minimize Iran's ability to play the "divide and rule" game, including apparent Russian acquiescence to continue arms control discussions without this being contingent on the US discontinuing its plans for missile defense, which has been a sore point in US-Russian relations over the past few years.
Finally, there are signs that the sanctions option - the traditional lever of pressure in cases of nuclear proliferation - is being revisited. Obama is still struggling not to be perceived as supporting pressure in a way that might undermine his intention to engage, and according to media reports, he was reluctant to have the G-8 meeting decide on immediate sanctions on Iran for this reason. However, the meeting did result in setting a jointly agreed-upon late September deadline for assessing progress on negotiations with Iran. Secretary of State Clinton added her own comments on the need for stricter sanctions on Iran to change the behavior of the regime. This is a much firmer message with a clearer deadline - previously Obama had only vaguely conveyed his intention to review the situation on Iran at the end of the year.
While these indications that levers of pressure are being put in place are a positive development, the subtle approach has its limits, and Iran will no doubt need to see a stronger message coming from the international community. Obama's attempts to straddle both absolute commitment to engagement and increased pressure on Iran will get more and more difficult to pull off. At some point soon he will have to simply state that without pressure, Iran is unlikely to be serious about negotiations.
It should be highly indicative that even when Obama took steps to address Iran's sensitivities, in order not to be perceived as interfering in its internal affairs, he was accused of doing just that. The lesson is that Iran's attitude toward the US is driven by what Iran seeks to achieve, and not perceptions of US accommodation. In fact, accommodation can be interpreted as a weakness to be exploited. To succeed on the Iranian nuclear issue, the US will ultimately have to embrace its own interests and follow through with determination.
