November 16, 2008
INSS Insight No. 79,
Roni Bart
Regardless of the perpetual question whether it is good or bad for the Jews, many Israelis are undoubtedly glad that Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. They regard his election as an American and universal affirmation of equality and overcoming of prejudice. Nor should any Israeli alarm aroused by an African-American candidate once labeled - incorrectly - as Muslim who is tainted by his connections with anti-Semitic individuals and by his distance from the hawkish faction of American Jews be heeded. Obama is committed to Israel - its existence, security, and prosperity - on the basis of the Judeo-Christian heritage, the democratic values of the two countries, and common strategic interests.
The inclination of the president-elect and the Democrats in general to engage in dialogue with their opponents in the international arena surfaces poignantly in the question of Iran. Obama has called for direct talks with Iran, not contingent on Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment. He thereby deviated not only from the policy of the Bush administration, but also that of the Europeans (it is possible that this was the motive for leaking the French president's opposition to the "naïve" position of the Democratic candidate). Obama regards Iran as a regional and global threat whose possession of nuclear weapons is "unacceptable." Thus does he not rule out a military option, which according to his approach will benefit from broader support only after the US has already demonstrated that it has made every possible diplomatic effort. On the other hand, he has criticized not only the Republicans for bellicose and aggressive rhetoric, but also Senator Hillary Clinton.
In interviews, Obama has been unwilling to address the possibility that diplomacy and sanctions will fail, and rejects escalated "saber-rattling" and "cowboy diplomacy" rhetoric as long as a serious and direct effort has not been exhausted. This is another sign of a more Democratic-European-"Western" approach, which is likely to weaken the latent military threat, and therefore also the effectiveness of diplomacy.
The potential friction with Israel on this issue could be heard several days after the US elections in comments by Israeli foreign minister and prime ministerial candidate Tzipi Livni. She explained that in the Middle East, willingness to engage in direct and unconditional talks after failing to pressure through sanctions would be interpreted as weakness. In an answer to an explicit question whether Israel supports this policy, Livni answered that it did not (Binyamin Netanyahu, also running for prime minister, would seemingly agree with her on this point). At this stage, it is still unclear how the president-elect intends to combine an attempt at direct dialogue with the more intensive effort at sanctions that he promised, and the chances of success in these attempts are decidedly uncertain.
On the other hand, a long time will likely pass before Iran suspends or halts its nuclear program, or before the Obama administration recognizes that these processes have exhausted their usefulness. Iran has already demonstrated its great expertise in both dragging out negotiations and in exploiting this extra time for the achievement of technological progress. It will be very difficult for the Israeli government to wait patiently for an indefinite period, particularly when the next US president appears to be the most dovish since President Carter in his willingness to use force.
Where the basic elements of US policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are concerned, Obama is positioned in the heart of the traditional pro-Israeli consensus in the US. He supports a two-state solution. He is committed to making every effort to help Israel achieve peace, but will not impose a settlement on it. He opposes the "right of return," and rules out Hamas as a negotiating partner until it meets the international community's well-known conditions. However, Obama's overall record paints a less rosy picture from Israel's viewpoint.
First, his veteran team of advisors (in contrast to Dennis Ross and others, who joined at a later stage) is composed of people with liberal positions, who focus on human rights, global development, and international cooperation. This posture generally regards Israel's intransigence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (backed by the excessive power of the pro-Israeli lobby) as the main problem in the Middle East, rather than radical Islam or Iran.
Second, Obama's public statements reflect a significantly more evenhanded position than the general American political map. He was the only candidate in either party that did not express support for the separation fence, which he chose to describe as "another example of the neglect of this administration in brokering peace." Obama used the phrase "cycle of violence" instead of the accepted wording among supporters of Israel, "Palestinian violence and Israeli response."
Thirdly, after the failure of the Camp David summit, he criticized the Clinton administration for its unconditional and one-sided support of Israel. Obama currently regards the Clinton parameters, which exceeded the Camp David positions, as a point of departure for a permanent settlement.
Finally, where the diplomatic process is concerned (the roadmap and/or Annapolis), Obama said that his administration would ask Israel to share responsibility for changing the status quo, and would help "Israelis to identify and strengthen those partners who are truly committed to peace." This is a diplomatic expression for the idea of exerting pressure, which also indicates his principal direction. Indeed, when Obama talks about concrete measures, he lists only demands of Israel, such as alleviating pressure on Palestinian daily life and freezing settlements. He mentions no demands of the Palestinians, such as fighting terrorism or democratic governmental reforms.
All this suggests that as part of his general view of American global priorities, Obama is more attentive to Palestinian rights than Israel's security needs. He will probably bring a greater sense of urgency to the diplomatic process, with less patience for Israeli foot-dragging in fulfilling its obligations in the diplomatic process. This creates potential friction with not only a Netanyahu government, but likewise with a Livni government.
In addition, it can be expected that the Obama administration will enthusiastically support negotiations between Israel and Syria, if Israel's next government wishes to continue the talks. Indeed, herein lies the president-elect's basic diplomatic approach; he himself wishes to engage in dialogue with Syria, mostly about Iraq and Iran. He has also explicitly stated that if Israel decides that its national interest lies in talking with Syria, it is the duty of the US to lend a hand in the matter. In the bilateral sphere, a continuation of very good relations can also be expected. The administration will likely not initiate a cut in aid, despite the economic crisis. Obama has said that he will not cut foreign aid in general, but will refrain from increasing it. It cannot be ruled out, however, that Congress will insist on reducing foreign aid (and cut aid to Israel in the process).
Were Israel not beginning an election campaign, the Israeli government could take advantage of the next five months to influence the new US administration before and during the formulation of its policy. In actuality, the opposite will occur: when the new Israeli government takes office five months from now, the Obama administration will to a great degree have already crystallized its expectations from the new Israeli government. The first meeting between the president and the prime minister will almost certainly be excellent, but sources of friction on the Iranian and Palestinian issues already exist.
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