July 21, 2008
INSS Insight No. 63
Shapir, Yiftah
On July 9, the Iranian media announced the launching of nine missiles of various types as part of an exercise called the Payambar-e Azam 3 (Great Prophet 3). The exercise, which began on July 8 and coincided, with an exercise by the Persian Gulf fleets of the US and British navies off the coast of Bahrain, was presented as an exercise by the naval and air forces of the Revolutionary Guards (the entity responsible for operating Irans long range ballistic missiles).
No details of the exercise itself or the forces taking part in it were disclosed, other than the launching of missiles on the second day of the exercise. Iranian sources said that nine missiles were tested simultaneously. These included Zelzal and Fateh missiles with ranges of 400 and 170 kilometers and improved accuracy, as well as upgraded Shahab-3 missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers. Television stations and internet sites later displayed photographs of the launchings. One photograph showed the launching of a Shahab-3 missile, and another showed the simultaneous launching of four or five heavy rockets.
The Iranian announcements involved quite a degree of exaggeration. First of all, the long range missile launched appears identical to missiles whose photographs have already been shown in the past. Technologically speaking, it is not feasible to extend the range of such a missile from 1,300 up to 2,000 kilometers without far reaching changes in the missiles structure.
Second, the figures reported for the other missiles were also exaggerated. The Zelzal-2 rocket is known to be an artillery rocket lacking a guidance system, with a range of about 200 kilometers, while the Fateh missile is probably a model of the same rocket with partial guidance capability and a range that also does not exceed 200 kilometers. Neither of these weapons is very accurate; they are designed for general bombardment of large targets, such as military bases or cities.
Third, perceptive observers noticed a great resemblance between the launches portrayed this time and those shown as part of the Great Prophet 2 exercise in November 2006. They pointed out the possibility that some of the missiles seen in the pictures were added to the original ones with graphics software.
Thus from a technical standpoint, it appears that this is another case of much ado about nothing. The Shahab-3 missile displayed is indeed capable of reaching targets in Israeli territory. These missiles, which are designed to carry nuclear warheads once the Iranians obtain them, currently carry conventional warheads with a few hundred kilograms of high explosives. It is unknown how many of these missiles are in the Iranian order of battle, but their number is estimated at a few dozen.
Nor was there anything tactically special in the missile launching event. What was shown on television did not look like a technical trial, nor was it an operational exercise: there was no practice deployment of missile batteries, rapid launching, or redeployment to alternative positions. In fact, it does not appear that the launching was combined with any military maneuvers whatsoever. On the contrary it all looked like a military display designed to impress observers.
All this, however, is emblematic of an alarming trend towards increasing saber rattling. The exercise was accompanied by belligerent declarations from Iranian leaders. Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohammed Ali Jafari, who assumed his post only recently, declared that the purpose of the exercise was to show that we are ready to defend the entire Iranian nation. Another spokesman declared, If Washington and Tel Aviv are stupid enough to even consider attacking Iran, our first response will be aimed at Israel and American interests in the Persian Gulf, and will set them on fire.
The Iranians are not operating in a vacuum. It appears that the well-covered exercise was designed to respond to what they regarded as American and Israeli threats to attack Iranian nuclear installations. On July 2, during a visit to Germany, President Bush said that if diplomacy fails, all options are on the table. While he added that for the US the preferred option was solving the problem through diplomatic means, this declaration was regarded as a veiled threat to use force. This statement reminded many of similar statements in 2002 on the eve of the military campaign in Iraq.
On the Israeli side, signs have multiplied recently allegedly indicating that Israel may be planning to attack Iranian nuclear installations independently. The most prominent indication was the recent report of an Israeli Air Force extensive maneuver over the Mediterranean in June. It was reported that over 100 F-15 and F-16 warplanes took part in this exercise, as well as refueling airplanes and rescue helicopters. The aircraft flew a range of 1,400 kilometers about the same distance as that separating Israel from the Iranian enrichment facility in Natanz. Observers regarded this maneuver as a practice run for an attack against Iranian targets, and as sending a significant deterrent message that such an attack is possible from both a technical military and l and apolitical standpoint.
Furthermore, several senior Israeli officials made many statements about the need to attack Iran. These statements indicate that a conviction is crystallizing in Israel that an attack on Iran is inevitable, the only dispute being about the timing whether to wait until Iran crosses some red line, or to hurry and attack while President Bush is still in office. There were even commentators who claimed that the US prefers that Israel attack Iran, despite the assumption that if such an attack takes place, Iran will respond against both Israel and the US, regardless of the identity of the actual attacker.
This circle of declarations and counter-declarations is bringing the region to a dangerous threshold, even if none of the parties wishes to escalate the conflict to the actual use of weapons. No Iranian leader can ignore these developments; he must take them with the utmost seriousness. Against this background, the Iranian demonstration of power should be seen as an attempt to deliver a message to both Israel and the US that Iran will be capable of responding.
Most of all, however, the launch demonstration was designed for internal needs. It can be assumed that Iran is well aware that while its statements are evaluated carefully, no one in Washington or Jerusalem is impressed by a fireworks display. The photographs were apparently aimed at calming the anxious Iranian citizen and at raising his spirits.
