July 13, 2008
by Tony Badran
The Meria Journal
Lebanon's civil war was a complex, multisided battle whose implications still shape the country's politics today. This article analyzes the forces involved domestically and the course of the war, drawing lessons that apply to the contemporary situation in Lebanon. (the following is an excerpt from an indepth analysis found HERE)
Lebanon's civil war has been one of the most complex, multifaceted wars of modern times due to its hybrid nature, multiple participants (both state and non-state actors), and its impact on regional, and even global balances of power.
The goal of this article is to identify the principal combatants during the various stages of the war, their equipment, and tactics, with an emphasis on urban warfare and military operations in built-up areas. In this context, the focus is on the Lebanese participants and not the regular, state armies involved: the Syrian Arab Army and the Israel Defense Forces. However, Syria and Israel were intimately involved in the war, and Syria in particular cannot be separated from various key battles that took place on its orders and/or through its direct intervention either with its regular armed forces or proxies.
In addition, since Palestinian military capabilities and preparedness have been covered far more than their Lebanese counterparts, they will not be addressed in extensive detail here.[1]
Finally, the 2008 Hizballah military operation in Beirut and the Shuf Mountains will be examined and compared with the civil war to see what lessons can be drawn today, especially in light of this crucial development.
The Nature and Course of the War
The causes of the war remain a matter of contention in Lebanon scholarship. Was it a war of "others" merely fought in Lebanon, using the Lebanese as tools and proxies, as Lebanese publisher and veteran diplomat Ghassan Tueni put it,[2] or was it a "Lebanese civil war" that drew in external players?
It was both. The non-Lebanese factor was central, even determinant, especially in the way the autonomous Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon strained the Lebanese system to the breaking point,[3] but also in the simple fact that the sustainability of the war effort--namely the supply of arms and ammunition--was completely dependent on foreign sources, which patronized factions that advanced their regional interests. Certain factors within the overall course of the Lebanon War were primarily regional--Israeli-Palestinian, Syrian-Palestinian, and Syrian/Iranian-Iraqi--even if they involved Lebanese proxies and/or allies.
By the same token, Lebanese parties also had the ability to torpedo unfavorable resolutions and to create situations that further involved the regional actors. The crisis was so intricately tied to regional and international dynamics that it was virtually impossible to disentangle them. Further, as the power of the militias grew and animosities deepened, the war took a life of its own, whereby even low-ranking militiamen could break a ceasefire out of sheer boredom.[4]
From a military standpoint, a defining feature of the war was that the Lebanese combatants were unable on their own to overrun each other and no single group was able to score a decisive victory over the other.[5] In order to achieve a decisive military triumph, one camp had to overtake, control, and hold the other camp's enclave. With the exception of the fights in Beirut itself, that never happened in the main sectarian enclaves throughout the war due both to domestic and regional (especially Syrian and Israeli) constraints.
Therefore, as Paul Jureidini, R.D. McLaurin, and James Price noted about the war's earliest phases, "[t]he period of April 1975 through March 1976 was in essence one of static and positional warfare."[6] This also applied to the mid-1980s, after sectarian consolidation created what became known as "cantons" not penetrable by opponents.
The increase in intensity, fighters, and weapons did not change that basic fact. Echoing this conclusion, Samir Kassir noted that during the build-up in fighters and arms, which took place during the long ceasefire in the summer of 1975, "[n]either the introduction of new arms nor the mobilization of a growing number of combatants substantially modified" the war's static nature.[7]
In many ways, this characterization serves to describe much of the war in general, not counting of course the advances and territory seizures by regular militaries--Syrian and Israeli.
Since enemy enclaves could not be overrun and taken over, artillery and rocket bombardment of enemy areas was never followed by effective infantry deployment and was thus limited to inflicting damage. It did not alter the overall military balance.[8] This was one of the major, and enduring, lessons of the Lebanese war.
The examples are numerous, but perhaps the most dramatic was the attempt by the Lebanese Forces to move into and establish a military presence in the Shuf Mountains in 1983-1984, after the Israeli invasion. Despite its significant capabilities (and its alliance with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at the time), the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia was not able to hold its positions in the Shuf. One year later, it was also defeated in eastern Sidon, where it had attempted to establish a presence.[9]
Fighting over and control of supply, access, and strategic routes was a prominent feature of the war, and particularly significant in terms of the sectarian/political geography of Lebanon. Strategic routes were at the heart of a number of battles: the attacks on the Dbayya and Tal al-Za'tar Palestinian camps and the Quarantina shantytown, the spring 1976 mountain offensive against the conservative Christian parties (especially the battles over Kahhala and Bologna, the gateway to Kisirwan), the Palestinian attack on the Christian coastal village of Damur, the battle of Zahla, and so on. Control of checkpoints on such roads, such as the infamous Barbara checkpoint held by the Lebanese Forces would play a major role in the internal coup within the Lebanese Forces in 1985 that saw the rise of Samir Geagea to the command of the militia.
Directly related to this securing of strategic roads was the consolidation of areas of influence (mainly along sectarian lines), whereby potential or actual enemy pockets would be eliminated.
All these factors shaped the balances of power on the ground, which went through several phases; this cannot be isolated from the broader regional interventions, especially by the Syrians both in the second half of the 1970s and after 1984, and the Israelis in 1982. Still, it can be said that by the mid-1980s, the situation outside of Beirut had consolidated into sectarian "cantons" next to areas dominated by the Syrians in the east and the north, and Israel's security zone in the south. This status quo would remain until the Syrian invasion of the Christian enclave in 1989, ending the war and completing the military occupation of Lebanon--which lasted until April 26, 2005, when the Syrians withdrew their troops. The Israelis had completed their withdrawal five years earlier, in May 2000.
The Main Combatants
When the war broke out, the three main groupings on the scene were the conservative or status quo parties--often dubbed "rightist" or "rightist-Christian"--and the revisionist camp--often dubbed "leftist" or "leftist-Muslim"--along with the various Palestinian forces, who aligned themselves with the later camp and helped train, arm, and even man its various militias.
The exact number of fighters in each camp is difficult to ascertain given the significant divergence in available sources. This is compounded by the fact that many of the fighters were not full-time soldiers, and some left the fighting--or even the country--or even switched sides at different junctures during the war. (Continue to full report)
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