July 8, 2008
Nimrod Raphaeli and Bianca Gersten*
Meria Journal

An examination of Syrian-Iranian economic relations reveals that, beyond their propaganda value, these relations are of small benefit to Syria and of negligible benefit to Iran. The alliance between the two countries is driven first and foremost by political and strategic interests rather than by economic considerations. As neither Iran nor Syria is considered a reliable source of data, it is difficult to draw a clear picture on the nature and depth of these economic relations. Often distorted anecdotal figures create a misleading reality in order to serve political objectives. At times it seems the two countries are engaged in mutual deception to create a myth of economic collaboration that exists on paper only. To the extent there is depth to the relationship, it is political and strategic but not economic.

OVERVIEW

The burgeoning relationship between Syria and Iran dates back to 1979, when Imam Ruhallah Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran from his exile in France to launch the first full-fledged Islamic revolution in modern history. The date marks the beginning of a new brand of Islamic theocracy based on the principle of wilayat-e-faqih, or the rule of the jurist, who in this case was Khomeini himself. No sooner had the revolution established itself and routed its domestic opponents than a new strategy was put in motion--the export of the tenets of the Iranian Islamic Revolution to the rest of the Middle East. Alarmed by the perceived threat of an onslaught by a Shi'a branch of Islam on predominantly Sunni regimes in the region, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, perhaps encouraged by other like-minded Sunni leaders, initiated a bloody conflict with Iran that lasted for eight years--from 1980 to 1988--inflicting terrible losses on their respective populations and bringing destruction to the infrastructure and economic assets of both countries.

With the breakout of the war between Iraq and Iran, secular Syria sided with Iran not for love of its Shi'a revolutionary theocracy, but because of the expectation that the war would end with the demise of Syria's Ba'thist nemesis in Baghdad. It was hatred for Saddam Hussein above all else that shaped Syrian strategy with regard to the conflict. Furthermore, hatred of Saddam was also behind then Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad's joining the United States-led multinational military coalition in 1991 that expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait, which had been invaded by Iraq the year before.

The Islamic Republic of Iran readily welcomed Syria as an ally against Iraq as a way of breaking the wall of hostility that was erected by the Sunni Arab countries--primarily Egypt and Saudi Arabia--to shield them from Iran's revolutionary fervor. Two decades later, Iran's foreign minister, Manuchehr Mottaki, declared in Damascus: "Actually, the strategic relations between the two important countries in the region [meaning Iran and Syria] are a trust placed in our hands by our late leaders Imam Khomeini, may Allah have him rest in peace, and Hafiz al-Asad."[1] Mottaki denied Asad similar a blessing.

Hafiz al-Asad was shrewd, calculating, and an Arab nationalist at heart. He kept his cards close to his chest and his foreign policy at bay from the Islamic Republic. It was his way of preserving Syria's independence in the Arab arena while at the same time benefiting from Iranian economic aid and political support. In the words of Syrian journalist and writer Hussein al-Awdat, "Syria gained economically without losing on the Arab front while keeping its independent decision[making capacity]."[2]

Although Asad and Saddam Hussein were politically estranged, this did not prevent Saddam from using the Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline to smuggle oil to Syria in contravention of the UN sanctions and the Oil-for-Food Program, nor did it prevent Syria from accepting Iraqi oil at a heavily discounted price. When challenged about accepting the smuggled Iraqi oil, Syria's response was that it was merely testing the pipeline.

If there was a fundamental trait that characterized the policies of Hafiz al-Asad, it was caution, reinforced by ability to balance conflicting interests. Both Syria and Iran were isolated in the region, and both sought each other for political support. The sanctions by the United States on both countries--and in the case of Iran, sanctions by the United Nations Security Council as well--forced them to seek strength by mitigating the consequences of isolation. Asad the son, inexperienced and adventurous, may have found a soul mate and source of comfort from his increasingly isolated position in the flamboyant and populist president of Iran since 2005, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Bashar al-Asad could not overlook a statement such as the one made by Iran's minister of defense that "the security of Damascus is more important than the security of Tehran."[3] It would have been out of character for Arab nationalist al-Asad to declare that the security of Tehran was more important than that of Damascus.

Syria's isolation was amply demonstrated at the Arab Summit meeting held in Damascus on March 29-30, 2008. It suffices to point out that among the nine heads of state absent from the summit, six were heads of state from the seven original founding members of the Arab League: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Syria was the seventh founding member and the only one represented by its president at the summit.

For Iran, the growing relationship with Syria was important but far from exclusive. Not willing to put all its eggs in the Syrian basket, Iran moved vigorously to erect surrogate satellites, including Hizballah in Lebanon, the Shi'a militias in Iraq, and Islamic Jihad and the Hamas Islamic Movement in the Gaza Strip. In all these endeavors, Syria was counted upon to play the role of more of a secondary collaborator than a full-fledged and equal partner. In fact, the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon may constrain Syrian aspirations to ever reestablish its hegemony over Lebanon.

Apart from a potentially long-term conflict over Lebanon, the two countries have little in common: Arab versus Persian identities, secular versus theocratic regimes, a Sunni majority in Syria versus Shi'a predominance in Iran. The issue of Arab identity versus Persian identity, in particular, is a fundamental element of Syrian cultural history. The Bashar al-Asad regime, built on the support of a small minority of Alawites (an offshoot of Shi'ism), must be particularly concerned about the rise of the Salafi movement among its majority Sunni population--which, similar to the Saudi population, considers Muslims who adhere to the Shi'a branch of Islam, which is dominant in Iran, as apostates. In this regard, Syria must also be concerned about 1.5 million Iraqi refugees, mostly Sunnis, who did not escape sectarianism in Iraq, falling under Iranian Shi'a domination.

Syria should also be concerned about an Iran-dominated Iraq, which could run contrary to its Arab nationalist conviction that favors a unified Arab nation at some future time. Damascus sees itself as the intellectual heart of the Arab nation and though Iran is a friend and an ally, a neighboring Iraq dominated by Iran would be an anathema to Syria's Arabist outlook and aspirations. Indeed, Iran is better kept physically separated from Syria by the entire width of Arab Iraq.

In his inaugural speech on the celebration of "Damascus the Capital of Arab Culture 2008," President Bashar al-Asad called Damascus "the capital of Arab dignity, not simply a city or a capital." "Damascus," he said, "carried a big and total meaning in the Arab consciousness, as the source of spiritual wealth and a fountainhead of creativity." He concluded his long celebratory speech with cultural overtones: "Our message is one of solidarity with the Arab nation, with the language of our great ancestors, with the great universal values bestowed to us from God."[4] Among the many dignitaries present at the event and recognized by Asad were the emir of Qatar, the president of Turkey, and the former president of Lebanon. Asad made no mention of an Iranian presence.

The true Arab nature of Syrian politics was avidly demonstrated in the Arab League's summit meeting referred to earlier, in which Syria sided with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and against Iran. A few days later, the Iranian daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami criticized Syria for supporting the final communiqué, which established the sovereignty of the UAE over three islands occupied by Iran. The daily wrote that despite its good relations with Iran, Syria had acted unfairly towards its friend.[5] By siding with the UAE over the three disputed islands, Syria opted to stay on the Arab side, motivated in part by the expectation of an increased flow of oil money into its stagnant economy.

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