Written by Right Side News
Qods force sends arms and roadside bombs to Iraq for terrorist attacks
Despite claims from some quarters that the regime has in recent months reduced its terrorist involvement and the transfer of arms and Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP) to Iraq, reliable intelligence reports show that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - Qods Force (IRGC-QF) continues to train and despatch terrorist networks and transfer arms and roadside bombs to Iraq. I can confirm today that based on new accurate information put at the disposal of the National Council of Resistance of Iran by the main democratic opposition group, the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, the regime is behind more than 80 percent of all EFP and other deadly attacks across Iraq. The only difference now is that the regime is being more sophisticated about the methods it uses to transfer this lethal technology to Iraq. It now uses smugglers and other methods to cover its tracks.
Iran’s arms production industry has intensified its production of EFPs and has developed deadlier models, which are being transferred en masse to Iraq and Afghanistan.
The smugglers are operatives of the various groups and parties that have ties to the Qods Force, including the Badr Organisation, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly known as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI), the Hezbollah Movement, and the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. These networks receive arms in Iran in coordination with the tactical Fajr, Zafar, Ra’ad and Nasr garrisons. They then smuggle the arms into Iraq from the border region using the extensive resources they receive from the regime.
The activities of these special terrorist networks are administered by the Qods Force in Iran and they are directed by veteran commanders with ties to the Qods Force, such as Abu Mehdi Mohandes and Abu Mostafa Sheibani. The transfer of arms is being conducted by indigenous Iraqis who are directly overseen by the Qods Force. These operatives are in contact with both the Qods Force and the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
The arms and EFPs which are being sent to Iraq are being put at the disposal of terrorist militias linked to the Qods Force. They are also being made available to the Badr Organisation, and through Abu Hassan Ameri, to terrorist groups based in Iraq such as al-Qaeda. The Qods Force is responsible for providing more than 80% of the arms, ammunition and bombs being used across Iraq.
According to accurate information obtained by the sources of the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, in recent months more than 30 active networks have been identified smuggling weapons and ammunition in Diyala, one of the six Iraqi provinces bordering Iran.
The following are some of the latest intelligence relating to the arms production industry of the regime’s Ministry of Defence for production of EFPs sent to Iraq and the networks transferring the weapons to there as well as the methods used by the Qods Force to smuggle the packages across:
Incessant activities of bomb producing factories in Iran
In May 2006, the Iranian Resistance revealed precise information about EFP production at the Sattari production unit in Lavizan, Tehran. These bombs are produced in accordance with a secret order submitted by the Qods Force.
While the regime’s Foreign Ministry speaks of Iran’s constructive role in Iraq and its contribution to the reduction of violence there, according to reliable information obtained by the PMOI, the Qods Force has ordered greater quantities of more powerful roadside bombs from the regime’s Defence Industries Organisation (DIO). Thus, the regime has greatly stepped up production of EFPs. So much so that alongside the Sattari production unit in Lavizan, the regime is building and testing more powerful roadside bombs at the Parchin production unit, south of Tehran.
Design and construction of new model EFPs
1. At present, in addition to the production of EFPs at Sattari, new models of EFPs are being produced in Sector Five of the Parchin unit. The official in charge is engineer Kalantari who is the head of the quality control directorate of Sector Five.
2. In the quality control directorate, engineers Mohammadi, Nouri and Rahimi report to Kalantari.
3. The planning and testing of EFPs are being conducted in the Moham Research Centre, which is affiliated to the Ammunition & Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) of the DIO. Engineer Chahadouri runs the Moham Research Centre.
4. Within the Moham Research Centre several teams are developing advanced armour-piercing bombs.
5. The expert on EFPs in the Moham research centre is Ali Mohammadi, who is in charge of the materials group. His group carry out specialised development of these bombs. The experts who are working on this project include engineers Kiomars Farhadi, Karbalai and Arbabi-far.
6. The research conducted at this centre on the development of these bombs and the various projects associated with them is highly sensitive and secret.
7. The regime is producing various types of bomb, but they are generally referred to as EFPs. However, the various types of bomb are identified by a distinct number.
8. A further secret aspect of the regime’s work in the Moham research centre is the development of impenetrable armour (materials that can withstand EFP bombs).
9. Research is being done on future bomb models at the Shahid Shiroodi industry. This is one of the factories producing armaments in Lavizan. The details of the team working on this project are as set out below:
• Mohsen Taqizadeh, veteran expert of industrial engineering, the Moham group, head of IT in the Shahid Shiroodi Industrial unit.
• Akbar Asadi Azizloo, financial and trade expert in the Moham group.
• Darious Mohammadi Ahani, expert on substance engineering and metallurgy at the production unit of the Shahid Shiroodi industry.
• Sirus Shojaei, expert on industrial engineering in the Shahid Shiroodi industry responsible for quality control.
10. These individuals started their research in 1384 and the main and most experienced individuals are Taghizadeh and Shojaei.
11. Engineer Shahryar Moqadam who is an expert on materials and metallurgy works on armour piercing projects in Sayad Shirazi industries, which is a series of factories of arms production industries. Engineer Salem who works with Sharyar Moqadam is in charge of the quality control directorate in the Sayad Shirazi industry. These individuals are aware of the projects in Moham for building EFPs.
Location of training and EFP testing
Tests on newer models of EFPs are carried out at Tir Square in Hesare Amir in the Parchin industry unit. This area is located in the vicinity of Parchin in specifically set up for the testing of new weaponry (the photos of this area are presented).
Tir Square in Parchin is supervised by the Parchin Chemical Industries . Mahmood Farzin-Pey is in charge of regular experiments at the grounds there. Farzin-Pey is an official of the supervisory directorate of the Chemical Industries.
Hajj Gheitani is in charge of the supervisory directorate of the Chemical Industries.
Individuals who come from the DIO to Tir Square to test the weaponry are coordinated by Revolutionary Guards Colonel Gooderzi at the Sasad Bassij Unit (of the DIO). Colonel Gooderzi on each occasion writes an official request to the Chemical Industries and informs them of the number of individuals from the DIO that they require for weapons testing.
Tests on special weapons, including EFPs, are carried out at a site situated adjacent to Tir Square. Engineer Manzavi, who heads the Chemical Industries unit, is in charge of tests carried out there. Engineer Manzavi coordinates via letter the tests carried out on newer bomb models there and at Sector Five of Parchin Industry. The work undertaken there is considered top secret.
The information here clearly shows that the regime’s Ministry of Defence has vastly stepped up its projects to manufacture various forms of EFPs. At least three sections of its industries at Parchi, Shiroudi and Satari are currently engaged in the production of these typed of bombs. This indicates clearly that the mullahs’ regime has stepped up the transfer of these types of weapons to Iraq and Afghanistan. Even Coalition commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan concede that the majority of roadside bombs and explosive packages are being sent from Iran.
Details of a number of networks transferring weapons to Iraq
Currently the Qods force uses parties and groups with ties to the Revolutionary Guards as well as local smugglers in the border regions to smuggle bomb packages, rockets and other weaponry via the border posts in the provinces of Khuzestan, Ilam, Kermanshah and Kurdistan. The table on display has the details of 51 major weapons smuggling networks with ties to the Qods force which in recent months have smuggled weapons from Iran to Iraq. Among them are the following 16 networks:
1. Weapons-smuggling networks in al-Amara
Seyed Adeir al-Mousawi from the town of Kahla in the province of Meysan is in charge of this network which smuggles weapons from Iran to al-Amara and Baghdad. Among the weapons smuggled by this group include an assortment of firearms, grenades, RPGs, Uzis, and anti-tank TOW missiles. The arms are transported in goods vehicles carrying fruits. This group also steals weapons from British forces through its agents in al-Amara and Basra.
Abu-Ali Saedi is an official in the group responsible for transporting roadside bombs to al-Amara. He is a veteran member of the Badr Organisation and works in direct contact with the Qods Force. Previously, he has worked with Brigadier General Hamid Taqavi, a senior official in the Qods Force. His network smuggles Klashnikovs, grenades, mortars, RPG-7s, shoulder-launched Strella missiles, anti-tank rockets, and roadside bombs from Iran into Iraq. The consortments are usually brought through Houralhavizeh. Abu-Ali Saedi is in contact with Abu-Jamal Fartousi, an official from a major network conducting terrorist attacks against British forces in Meysan Province. Abu-Ali Saedi also from time to time provides weaponry to groups working against the Coalition in Baghdad.
Another official of the network transporting the roadside bombs from Meysan to Baghdad is Abu Teysir (a.k.a. Rashid) who has a senior government post in the town of Kahla. Abu Teysir, a former member of the Dawa Party, has since switched allegiance to the Badr Organisation.
2. Weapons-smuggling networks in Basra
Abu Ali from the Qarneh region of Basra Province is a smuggler of weapons from Iran with each successful trip taking between one to one-and-a-half months. Ali Qomi, an operative of the Qods Force, transfers weapons by boat to the Faw region from an island to its south. Abu-Heydar Jabouri then collects the arms in Faw and takes them to Basra where he delivers them to Abu Ahmad Rashed, who heads the Badr Organisation in Basra, and Abu Moslem.
In recent months, the Qods Force has transferred large quantities of 107 mm rockets, roadside bombs, and anti-tank mines to armed militias and the Seyyedol-Shohada Movement in Basra, which are used against British and American bases in the south.
3. A network smuggling weapons to Baghdad
One of the militias with ties to the Qods Force are transferring explosive packages and other arms from Iran via the Firouzkhan outpost (which faces Qasr-e Shirin on the Iranian side). The group then transports the arms in trucks carrying vegetables and potatoes to the al-Dorra region of Baghdad and hand them over to insurgents at the Tareh-bar Market. Sheikh Mohammad Hardan Al-Naeimi and Sheikh Abdol-Hadi Kazem al-Moussawi are two of this group’s commanders based in the al-Azi district of Meghdadieh.
4. Weapons-smuggling networks between Mehran (Iran) and Badra (Iraq)
Khorram Abadi, an affiliate of Abu-Mostafa Sheibani based in the Iranian town of Mehran, is in charge of a network smuggling weapons from Iran to Iraq. He transfers the weapons in trucks carrying watermelons from Mehran to Badra, where he hands them to Fowad Farhani. Farhani and Abu Ali Hossein (a.k.a. Abu Fatemeh) then take the weapons to Kut where they are distributed among members of the Mahdi Army.
5. The Sobhal-Hashemi network in Khornabad
This network is active in smuggling weapons to Diyala province.
6. The Abu-Asame al-Khalesi network in Iraq’s Diyala province
Khazir Muhammad Ahmad al-Morooh (aka Abu Asame al-Khalesi), who heads the so-called Badr Popular Committees in al-Khalis, coordinates a large weapons-smuggling network between Iran and Iraq. He and an associate by the name of Abu Jamal routinely travel to Iran for this purpose.
Muhammad Kazem Abbas Tamimi also known as Abu Ali Tamimi, who heads the Badr Organisation’s headquarters in Beladrus, is a key figure in this network. Abu Ali Tamimi is from Meghdadieye and is currently a Colonel in the Iraqi Interior Ministry.
7. Weapons-smuggling network in the Chilat region
Two Iranians, Ali Farhad Khorasani and Hossein Ramezani, are in charge of a weapons-smuggling network operating in the vicinity of the Chilat border region. They transfer the weapons to the Ali Gharbi region of Iraq’s Maysan province where they hand them over to two Iraqis called Rasool Abdul Daraji and Muhammad al-Bahadoli, both of whom live in the town of Kamit. These two Iraqis are in contact with the Qods force.
8. Weapons-smuggling network of the Hezbollah Movement in Basra
The Secretary General of the Hezbollah Movement is Abu Mojtaba Sari, a member of the Iraqi Parliament and a Councillor Minister in the Al-Maliki government. This group is affiliated to the Qods force and operates a major weapons-smuggling network from Iran, in particular in southern Iraq. The head of this group in Basra is Abu Fatimeh al-Bazooni who is based in al-Modine in Basra province. Abu Hamid al-Mansouri is second in command there and is in charge of contacts with Iran. For this reason, he constantly travels to Iran.
9. Weapons-smuggling network in Diwanieh
Abu Hassan al-Tamimi (date of birth 1959) from Samaveh is a veteran Badr organisation official who is in charge of a weapons smuggling network. This network smuggles among other weapons, Katuchieh rockets.
10. The Hassan al-Tamimi network in Meqdadia
Sheikh Hassan al-Tamimi is in charge of this network. He is from the al-Azir region of Meqdadia.
11. The Shalal Vahib-Dakash network in al-Khalis
This network smuggles weapons and ammunitions from Khornabad to the town of al-Khalis, where they deliver them to militias loyal to the Qods force. Shalal Vahib-Dakash heads this network and is assisted by his brother Razaq Vahib-Dakash.
12. The Farhan Khozeir al-Mojama’i network in Khan Bani-Sad
Farhan Khozeir al-Mojama’i, based in the village of Rasoul on the outskirts of Khan Bani-Sad, is in charge of a weapons-smuggling network in Diyala.
13. The Saeed al-Hashemi network in Sadie Shat
Saeed al-Hashemi, a militia commander from the village of al-Shima on the outskirts of Khan Bani-Sad, is in charge of the network transferring weapons from the Mandali or Khaneghein border to Khornabad, Howeydar and Sadr City.
14. Weapons-smuggling network for militias in Baghdad
This group uses militia operatives in Baghdad to smuggle the weapons from Iran to Baghdad. Seyed Kazem Azarvejavi is in charge of this group. He lives in district thirty of Sadr city. This group uses the Shahabi border post between Iran and Iraq to smuggle the weaponry and transports them using trucks and vehicles belonging to the Mahdi army via the Sheikh Sad region to the Jarf Andaf region in Baghdad. It then secretly stores them in the Hey Assanai district. Iron warehouses and carwashes in this district are used to store the weapons caches. These groups meet in the al-Sadr mosque and Islamic centre in district six. Hatem Salman al-Fariji, Ali Daeir al-Saedi, Naeem Mohan Ashuili and Basem Abdolzohreh are operatives of this group. They use Heynobari vehicles and Mercedes Benz trucks to transport the weapons.
15. Details of a weapons-smuggling network in Baghdad
This armed group operates in the al-Obeidi and Dore districts of Baghdad. Their task is to smuggle weapons from Iran to Baghdad and other provinces. After receiving the weapons from the regime, this network smuggles them via the Shahabi and Komeit border outposts into the Iraqi provinces of Vaset and Maysan. Seyed Haleim Lefteh al-Bavi is in charge of this group and is in contact with the Qods force. Other members of this network include Javad Mousa al-Mousavi, Muhammad Seyedoon al-Taii, Karim Soheil al-Hiyasi, Abbas Razi al-Jaberi and Falah al-Ghasab who lives in the district of al-Jomhourie in Kut. This group gathers and coordinates in Mousa Kazem mosque in district 54 of Sadr city. This network uses Mercedes Benz and other trucks to transport the weapons.
16. Details of a weapons-smuggling network in Ghazanieh
One group in the Ghazanieh region of Mandali works with .... Kurds of Mandali and Khaneghein to transfer weapons from the Qods force in Iran to Baghdad, Diyala and Wasit. Sheikh Yasser Honoon al-Tamimi from Jadide al-Shatt is the commander of this group. Among the groups members are Jafar Hamid al-Fatlavi, Muhammad Saddam al-Lami, Sad Taleb al-Obeidi and Hassan Mousa al-Gharavi who work with twenty .... Kurds. These individuals usually transport the weapons on Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays.
They use the following routes:
• Baghdad: Hosseinieh region to al-Sha’ab
• Diyala: Meghdadieh to al-Khalis to Jadide al-Shatt
• Wasit: Badra to Jassan to the Hile region situated close to Badra
Methods by the Qods force to smuggle weapons over the border
The Qods force uses both official border crossings and unofficial smuggling routes to transfer the weapons and ammunition to Iraq.
1. To transfer the weapons via the official border crossings, it uses operatives of groups tied to the Qods force who are part of the Iraqi border patrol and customs officers.
2. When using the unofficial smuggling routes, the actions are coordinated with the army and state security forces and the Revolutionary Guards to cross the border.
3. In certain instances, the weapons are escorted by security firms such as the al-Ehsan firm which is affiliated to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and belongs to Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, so that when they reach checkpoints they have the necessary pass to bypass. Bribing of checkpoint officers is also common practice.
4. Methods of concealing the weapons in large vehicles include, placing the items in designated storage compartments underneath regular loads, such as household products, food, vegetables and fruit. For smaller vehicles the weapons are concealed under manure, so that when they pass through a checkpoint, it seems as though the load is standard farmer’s goods. Another method is the use of fuel tankers to transport the weapons. The tanker is made into three compartments. The front and rear compartments are filled with fuel while the middle compartment is stocked with weapons and ammunitions.
5. Checkpoints which are more precarious or which are not manned by pro-regime elements usually the smugglers use alternative secondary routes. Since the grounds are flat and plain smaller vehicles do not have any problems following these routes. Local villagers who know the terrain act as guides.
6. In circumstances where there is no possibility to use alternative routes to bypass the checkpoints, animals are used to go around them and the weapons are subsequently loaded onto vehicles at the other side.