Recent revelations by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) indicate that contrary to the findings of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Iran continues to have a nuclear weapons program which is in full flow. The NCRI first exposed Iran's nuclear weapons program to the world in 2002 and their evidence on this occasion seems once again to be accurate.

The evidence which was revealed at a press conference in Brussels pointed to a secret site which is dedicated specifically to furthering the weapons capabilities of Iran's nuclear program. Iran has specifically concentrated its efforts on building a nuclear warhead capable of carrying a nuclear bomb while also attempting to increase the distance of its long range missiles. The evidence further pointed to the fact that Iran has now acquired the services of North Korean scientists whose work is accelerating Iran's weapons program. 
Below:Well Known facility  Natanz

The development of Iran's nuclear warhead capabilities is greatly worrying when we realize how far the Iranian regime has developed all of the other components necessary to build a nuclear bomb. The most significant component necessary is a sufficient amount of weapons grade uranium. This component could well be achieved by the end of 2008 according to tests conducted by European Union experts. Their deeply worrying findings were made after the experts simulated Iran's centrifuges working at full capacity.

Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently provided documents to its 35 nation board, which indicate that Iran may well have been focusing on a nuclear weapons program well past the 2003 estimate of the NIE. The regime on this occasion rejected the findings by simply referring to the documents as "forgeries" that were provided to the IAEA by a terrorist organization.

This was clearly a reference to the Mujahedeen Khalq (People's Mojahedin of Iran), which is the opposition group believed to have provided much of the information which the NCRI has exposed over the years. The MEK/PMOI is the largest of all of Iran?s opposition groups and is without doubt the only one which Iran seems to fear. Therefore, the West in its negotiations felt that it had found a trump card when it used the PMOI as a bargaining chip with Tehran. The belief was that the terror listing of Iran?s largest resistance group would make Iran see sense. This act of appeasement backfired badly, as

Iran saw this action by the West as one of weakness. Weakness which was used by Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program while increasing its worldwide terrorist activities.

Time has shown the terror listing of the MEK/PMOI to have been a major blunder by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. Not only has this action sent the wrong message to Tehran, but more critically it has left the West lacking a major option when searching for a solution to the Iran crisis.

The PMOI has succeeded recently in two courts of law in its attempts to overturn this terror listing. Both the European Court of Justice and the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission found in the PMOI's favor when deciding that the terror tag on the PMOI must be set aside.

It is now time that the West adopts a fair stance against Iran's opposition by removing it from the terrorism list with immediate effect. Such an action will not only be fair and just, but it will also send a message to Tehran that the West will not sit by as Iran continues with its nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, in order to hinder Iran?s nuclear weapons program the West must implement a set of sanctions which are firm and comprehensive. The sanctions must most importantly target Iran?s banks and front companies for Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which act as the funding base for Iran's nuclear program.

Only with such a policy can we be expected to deal with the threat posed by Tehran while also allowing the Iranian people to bring about the democracy they desire.

SOURCE: Lt. Cdr. Esmaeil Abnar is a retired Iranian navy officer who served for 18 years in the Shat al-Arab waterway prior to 1979. During his time in the Iranian Navy he became a supply officer and later a senior official in the Navy's personnel and public relations departments. He also saw several naval courses in Norfolk Base, Virginia, and Amphibious Base, San Diego, in the United States. 
Published also by Global Politician, link HERE